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ABSTRACT 
President Obama, the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security and other senior 
federal officials have emphasized that, in order to make our country safe and resilient, all 
levels of government, non-governmental organizations and the private sector must all 
work together.  This commitment to the shared responsibility requires the White House 
National Security Staff to make a commitment to engage meaningfully with stakeholders 
in the mission, through increased transparency and direct consultation. Continued 
engagement will not only build trust and support from those entities, but it will greatly 
improve the homeland security enterprise.  This research set out to identify a model for 
the White House National Security Staff to consider using that would provide the most 
effective and efficient manner for the National Security Staff to engage local, state, tribal, 
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A. PROBLEM STATEMENT—BACKGROUND 
The Preamble of the Constitution sets the expectation that our government will, 
among other things, “insure domestic tranquility, provide for the common defense, and 
promote the general welfare.”  For most of our history, that goal expressed in our 
Constitution was satisfied by a national security system structured to meet threats deemed 
to arise from traditional state adversaries external to U.S. borders.  Prior to the 1940s, the 
President of the United States was the primary coordinator of national security policy.  In 
1947, the National Security Council was created as part of a larger reorganization of the 
United States national security structure established by the National Security Act of 1947. 
The national security system remained relatively unchanged until the terrorist attacks on 
September 11, 2001. 
The term “homeland security” became widely accepted on September 20, 2001, 
when President Bush used the term to name a new “Office of Homeland Security” 
established in the White House in October 2001.  Homeland security has generally come 
to mean the unified national effort to prevent, protect against, respond to and recover 
from threats and acts of terrorism, as well as other man-made and natural hazards. To 
quote from the 2007 National Strategy for Homeland Security: 
Homeland Security is a concerted national effort to prevent terrorist 
attacks within the United States, reduce America’s vulnerability to 
terrorism, and minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do 
occur…..This Strategy...recognizes that effective preparation for 
catastrophic natural disasters and man-made disasters, while not homeland 
security per se, can nevertheless increase the security of the Homeland. 
(U.S. Executive Office of the President, October 2007, p. 3)   
Homeland security is thus at least a subset of, or co-equal with, national security.  
Therefore, effectively structuring the homeland security system is key to the ability to 
maintain the American constitutional form of government. If the ability to maintain 
continuity of government and operations fails, then that failure would put at risk 
continuance of civil society in America. Presently, when developing homeland security 
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policy and strategies, including follow-on implementation plans, procedures, systems, 
and requirements, the White House National Security Staff and federal interagency 
homeland security leaders do not adequately incorporate state, local, tribal, and private 
sector homeland security and emergency management personnel into the policy 
development process. 
As the homeland security discipline has developed and evolved, issues have 
become increasingly complex—wider in scope, more varied, and with interconnectedness 
(Locher III, 2010).  Congressional and United States Government Accountability Office 
(GAO) reports have pointed out that, because there is a range of federal and nonfederal 
stakeholders with important responsibilities for homeland security, it is important that the 
Federal Emergency Management Administration (FEMA), Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS), and the White House include these stakeholders in its development and 
revisions of national policies and guidelines (Government Accountability Office [GAO], 
2008;Senate Governmental Affairs Committee Full Minority Staff, 2003;Stockton, 2009). 
President Obama’s National Security Strategy calls for, among other things, 
“strengthening national capacity through a whole-of-government approach” (Obama, 
2010).  State and local governments, including the police, firefighters, emergency 
medical technicians, emergency management services, public health workers, and other 
emergency management and homeland security professionals they employ, are critical to 
homeland security, making vertical coordination of homeland security strategies, policies, 
protocols, and procedures more important as a consequence.  Involving state and local 
government representatives in the federal policy development processes will bring state 
and local perspectives to bear on building an integrated homeland security system and 
would give them a say over the plans and programs they would need to implement 
(Homeland Security Advisory Council, 2008). 
The president has little authority to impose vertical integration when the Federal 
Executive Branch develops policy because of the constitutional form of government in 
the United States.  Governors do not work for the president and mayors do not work for 
governors; they are independently elected and are the sovereign chief executives of their 
states and cities. The Bush administration attempted to deal with this issue when it 
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created the Homeland Security Council (HSC).  In late September 2001, then-White 
House Chief of Staff Andrew Card promised that state and local governments would be 
represented on the HSC (Stockton, 2009). Including state and local representatives on the 
HSC would not only offer a way to compensate for the president’s lack of command 
authority over them, but it was also expected to increase the likelihood that they would 
support the policies they helped frame. 
The Bush administration established the Homeland Security Advisory Council in 
2002 to make recommendations to the HSC and included state and local officials on that 
panel; but it is advisory only, and the President selected the members rather than having 
the governors or mayors do so.  Because the HSC was not robustly staffed, it relied on 
the major departments to help it develop pre-decisional documents such as national 
strategies and policies.  In many cases, the HSC relied on the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) to integrate state and local efforts with federal homeland security 
policymaking, even as the spread of homeland security functions across the federal 
bureaucracy made integration increasingly difficult for any one department to coordinate.  
As a result, state and local governments provided input to a limited number of initiatives 
and therefore the administration issued federal policies and programs that conflicted with 
state and local programs. 
Two well-documented examples of the failure to integrate entities with diverse 
interests properly are the Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN) and the 
National Response Framework (NRF). The HSIN network is the key system used by 
DHS for sharing homeland security data with states and localities and is operated by state 
and local officials nationwide. Yet DHS did not coordinate with those officials to develop 
functional and useful joint policies and procedures, integrate HSIN with existing 
information sharing systems, and ensure that the network would meet state and local 
requirements (Stockton, 2009).  The NRF is the plan for integrating federal, state, and 
local agencies response to a disaster.  The Bush administration did not coordinate its 
development of the 2007 NRF with states and localities, and the current administration, 
as of the summer of 2011, had yet to put policies or procedures in place that provide for 
such coordination as a revised framework is developed (Roberts, 2008). 
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In summary, the above issues point to a need for an innovative, integrated 
national policy and strategy development process that would enable the country to better 
address the complex homeland security environment. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTION(S) 
In order to address the lack of integrated national policy and strategy development 
process, this thesis will address the following research questions:  
1. What are the National Security Staff and DHS coordination processes for 
seeking state and local government emergency management/homeland 
security professionals input on significant strategies and policies? What 
are the benefits and challenges of the current processes? 
2. What are the criteria to evaluate an effective policy development model? 
3. Do policy coordination models exist that may be applicable to the 
homeland security strategy or policy formulation processes? 
C. HYPOTHESES 
There is a need for the development of an innovative, integrated national policy 
and strategy development process that would enable the country to better address the 
complex homeland security environment. When developing homeland security policy and 
strategies, including follow-on implementation plans, procedures, systems, and 
requirements, the White House National Security Staff and federal interagency homeland 
security leaders must incorporate state, local, tribal, and private sector homeland security 
and emergency management personnel into the policy development process.   
The objective of this research is to provide a model for the White House National 
Security Staff to consider using to achieve integrated homeland security policy 
development.  The thesis will identify a model or critical elements for a successful model 
by evaluating and comparing current and possible methods and models used and 
determine if a model can be recommended.   
The model that is selected will need to ensure the broadest amount of input and 
representation.  There are over 87,000 jurisdictions in the United States, which correlates 
to millions of homeland security professionals in the form of law enforcement, fire, and  
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emergency medical officials, public health service employees, emergency medical 
technicians, and other homeland security professionals.  Each of these professions have 
organized professional associations, such as the: 
• National Homeland Security Consortium,  
• International Association of Police Chiefs,  
• International Association of Emergency Managers,  
• National Emergency Management Association,  
• National Association for Search and Rescue,  
• State emergency management associations (contained in multiple states).   
In addition, many states have established homeland security advisors to the 
governor and state homeland security agencies; this has led to the formation of the 
Council of Governors Homeland Security Advisors.  All these individuals and 
organizations have a voice and an opinion that can help shape the homeland security 
enterprise and, therefore, should have the opportunity to contribute to the national 
homeland security policymaking process. 
Many of the professional organizations do provide input to federal departments 
and agencies on homeland security, law enforcement, emergency management issues 
currently; however, there is no systematic way or one specific in-point to the White 
House National Security Staff (NSS).  For example, the Deputy Administrator of FEMA 
attended the entire week of the annual International Association of Emergency Managers 
2011 conference in order to provide information to the group and gather the International 
Association Emergency Managers (IAEM) members’ perspectives on homeland security 
and emergency management issues.  In a discussion with the Deputy Administrator, Rich 
Serino said that he values the “on-the-ground” professionals’ perspectives and those 
perspectives influence how policy and programs at FEMA are developed (personal 
conversation, 2010).  In addition, in discussing state and local input with the Special 
Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Resilience, Richard Reed stated that, in 
performing his role on the NSS, he talks to various members of the state, local, and tribal 
communities, emphasizing his periodic meetings with state homeland security advisors to  
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gain their perspectives on homeland security issues.  However, he agreed that his office 
and the National Security Staff as a whole do not have a systemic way of gathering input 
(personal conversation, 2010).  
The model selected should meet the intent and requirement of the Homeland 
Security Act (HSA) of 2002, U.S. Government Accountability Office recommendations, 
and other “think tank” organizations’ recommendations that the federal government work 
with state, local, and tribal governments and private sector and non-governmental 
organization.  The HAS of 2002, which established DHS, also codified the requirement 
for DHS to reach out to state, local, and tribal governments and the private sector in order 
for DHS to:  
• ensure adequate and integrated planning, training, and exercises occur and 
that first responders have the necessary equipment;  
• attain interoperability of the federal government’s homeland security 
communications systems with state and local governments’ systems;  
• oversee federal grant programs for state and local homeland security 
efforts; and coordinate warnings and information to state and local 
government entities and the public.   
In addition, numerous United States Government Accountability Office and 
“think tank” reports emphasize the need for the federal government to enhance 
partnerships with state and local governments to guard against terrorist attacks and 
improve national preparedness. 
The model that is adopted should ensure clarity of roles and responsibilities 
between federal, state, and local organizations. The emphasis needs to be on a national 
rather than a purely federal strategy.  Therefore, the state, local, and tribal governments, 
non-governmental, and private-sector stakeholders need to be involved in a collaborative 
effort to arrive at national goals.  The federal role needs to be considered in relation to 
several factors: other levels of government, the goals and objectives for preparedness, and 
the most appropriate tools to assist and enable other levels of government and the private 
sector to achieve these goals. 
There may not be a single, perfect model that can address all of the issues and 
requirements noted above. However, the goal of the thesis is to move the thinking and 
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organizational processes in a direction that will better inform the current policy making 
apparatus, hopefully resulting in sounder and more representative homeland security 
strategies and polices. 
D. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH 
The significance of the research is that it provides an overview of current models 
used to develop national security and homeland security policies, strategies, and follow-
on implementation plans, including how the models incorporate state and local input into 
national policy and strategies.  It will also provide an evaluation of different models and 
ultimately a recommended model or parts of various models for use by the White House 
National Security Staff.  Since the National Security Strategy was issued in 2007, there 
has been an interest from the federal side to include state and local input into homeland 
security policy and plans.  Some ideas have been presented as to how to best accomplish 
this task; however, the literature has not put forward a specific model.  In addition, the 
literature is devoid of a comparison between alternative policy options and the current 
homeland security policy development model. 
Prior to 9-11, local, state, tribal, and federal entities were not required to work 
together in such an integrated manner.  As more threats are identified, and national 
strategies are developed to mitigate them, states and locals will be part of the 
implementation of those strategies.  Therefore, they need to be part of their development.  
This research is timely as the homeland security enterprise matures. 
The primary consumers of this research will be White House National Security 
Staff and federal interagency senior officials who develop significant homeland security 
policy and strategy.  Other consumers include major homeland security professional 
associations, such as:  
• National Emergency Management Association (NEMA),  
• International Association Emergency Managers (IAEM),  




• International Association for Counterterrorism and  
• Security, the National Governor’s Association, and others. 
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II. METHODOLOGY AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. METHODOLOGY 
1. Process 
In order to write this thesis, a policy option analysis methodology was used.  The 
study focused on evaluating White House National Security Staff and federal executive 
branch homeland security policy development models to determine the extent the models 
provide for input from local, state, and tribal governments, non-governmental 
organizations, and private sector stakeholders.  The models were further evaluated 
against criteria in order to select the best model.  The research focused specifically on 
identifying a model that the President’s National Security Staff could apply when 
developing national homeland security policy such as Executive Orders (EO), 
Presidential Policy Directive (PPD), or Homeland Security or National Security 
Presidential Directives (HSPD/NSPD) that would integrate input from state, local, tribal 
governments and other stakeholders in order to develop a more robust and effective 
policy.  While EOs, PPDs, and HSPD/NSPDs provide federal direction, this federal 
policy is often incorporated within federal programs that affect the states.  For example, 
federal policy will be translated into grant requirements that affect how states must 
conduct homeland security activities in order to receive federal grant money. 
Specifically, the research set out to answer the following questions:  
• What are the current processes for seeking state and local government 
emergency management/homeland security professionals input on 
homeland security policy developed at the federal level by the White 
House National Security Staff? 
• What are the benefits of the processes? 
• What are the challenges or negatives of the processes? 
• Should the current process be improved? 
• If so, how might it be improved? 
 
 10 
From March 2011 to October 2011, the author engaged in a wide range of 
research and analyses.  The author started by reviewing current literature and research 
available on the topic.  The results of the literature review follow in the next section.  In 
general, the author reviewed:  
1. government reports such as reports and testimonies by the General 
Accountability Office (GAO), testimonies by government officials, 
inspector general reports,  
2. journal articles, and  
3. other sources such as scholar white papers and “think tank” reports.  
Reviews of Congressional legislation, Office of Management and Budget 
Circulars, and other government regulations were also conducted. 
Through the reviews, the case was built defining the study issue.  In short, it was 
determined that homeland security is not strictly a federal responsibility but rather a 
responsibility of the whole of government and community. Therefore, as the President’s 
Homeland Security Council and its supporting National Security Staff develop and issues 
homeland security policy, all stakeholders’ views need to be incorporated into the policy.  
Policy development should be both horizontally and vertically integrated. 
Next, the author identified three models to evaluate against defined criteria.  The 
models were selected based on the extent the model depicted a process by which federal 
agencies interacted with state, local, and tribal government homeland security 
professionals as well as the private sector and non-governmental organizations involved 
in the homeland security enterprise.  They were also selected based on the author’s ability 
to gather sufficient research material to thoroughly analyze and evaluate the model’s 
applicability to the National Security Staff.  In conducting the research, many homeland 
security professionals offered ideas on how to design a better model however those 
designs did not contain enough detail to evaluate against the selected criteria thoroughly.  
However, elements of these suggested models could be considered in the adoption or 
development of a model and could be explored in future research.  
The first model researched was the current homeland security policy development 
process used by the President’s National Security Staff responsible for homeland security 
issues with an emphasis on the Resilience Directorate’s process.  This model was 
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evaluated in order to establish the baseline model that the research aimed to improve or 
replace.  In order to evaluate the model, the author relied on the review of the literature 
and personal experience with the process. 
The second model researched was the process that the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) used to develop its Quadrennial Homeland Security Report (QHSR): A 
Strategic Framework for a Secure Homeland (2010).  The Implementing 
Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 required DHS to submit a QHSR.  
This homeland security review addressed both the threats presented and the framework 
for DHS’s strategic response, and it reported to be the most comprehensive assessment 
and analysis of homeland security to date (DHS, 2010).  In preparing the QHSR, DHS 
engaged thousands of state, local, tribal, and private sector stakeholders in the process. 
The third model reviewed was the process used by the DHS Office of Operations 
Coordination and Planning and the Under Secretary for Management’s Office of the 
Chief Information Officer to gather user requirements for an upgraded Homeland 
Security Information Network or HSIN.  The HSIN is a Web-based information system 
developed for the entire homeland security enterprise to be able to share homeland 
security information, such as intelligence information, law enforcement information, 
training material, policy, best practices and more.  The initial HSIN system was 
developed quickly after 9-11 and did not involve state, local, tribal governments or 
private sector input into the development of the system.  For the upgraded system, DHS 
used a structured model to include such input.    
The models were researched in order to identify either a model in whole or 
possible traits within a model to be used to develop a better policymaking process for the 
White House National Security Staff and federal executive branch homeland security 
policymakers.  
2. Criteria 
To determine the criteria to evaluate the models against, research was conducted 
on collaborative government, policymaking, decision-making, and policy and program 
implementation.  In reviewing research on collaboration, one paper suggested “success is 
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understood as the integration of stakeholders’ input into policy formulation and a 
willingness among policy makers to act on this input” (Woodford, 2010, p. 97).  
Collaboration, by definition, requires stakeholders to share problems, issues, and 
perspectives as they work together to solve problems beyond the abilities of an individual 
stakeholder (Woodford, 2010).  Collaborative policymaking is unique, but it can lead to 
policy that has stakeholder support, and it can promote trust between stakeholders, foster 
mutual learning, and increase government transparency, accountability, and legitimacy 
(Bevir, 2009).  As a process, collaboration requires trust, openness, and equality of the 
participants (Woodford, 2010).  In addition, research has shown that to be meaningful or 
effective, participation in collaborative policymaking must have the potential to effect 
policy decisions (Woodford, 2010). 
In a September 2004 report on effective regional coordination, the U.S. General 
Accounting Office (GAO) found several key characteristics of effective collaboration and 
coordination in the homeland security arena.  First, successful collaborative organizations 
provide structured forums to discuss policy problems, agree on possible solutions, and 
they include representation from many different jurisdictions and diverse stakeholders 
(GAO, 2004).  The decisions made collaboratively within these organizations generally 
have broader support than those that are made unilaterally.  Second, because national 
homeland security policy development is not traditionally a collaborative endeavor, there 
needs to be prescriptive requirements regarding group membership, decision-making 
processes, and planning that can establish minimum thresholds for those activities and 
may provide an incentive for coordination (GAO, 2004).  
Similar success factors were identified in other research through the evaluation of 
successful collaborative policy development process and program implementation.  First, 
collaboration—its adoption and successful implementation—depends on the willingness 
and support of the participants.  The participants must have an appreciation of others 
perspectives, competencies for collaboration, and commitment to the process.  When key 
senior government officials support the process by communicating their commitment as 
well as their belief in collaboration and support for policy change, it can create a 
facilitating context for successful policy collaboration.  
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Second, the design of the collaborative group influences the outcome (Woodford, 
2010).  There is value to establishing a group representing different parts of the homeland 
security enterprise.  But the group needs to have a formalized coordination committee or 
liaison roles, and the participants need to have sufficient authority (Hocevar & Jansen, 
2006).  From a problem-solving perspective, the merits of having stakeholders from 
various parts of the enterprise are common sense.  One study demonstrated that having a 
range of representatives from community and government working together contributed 
to the success of a specific policy initiative (Woodford, 2010). 
Third, collaborative groups have been more successful when they have clear 
purpose, goals, and objectives.  Although homeland security is filled with uncertainty, 
clear goals, and objectives allow partners to compare the collaboration to expectations 
thereby seeing the benefits of the relationship. 
Fourth, it is essential to ensure that facilitators have the competencies needed to 
advance successful collaboration, such as strong organizational, communication, and 
group skills (Woodford, 2010). It is also vital that they understand the importance of 
being authentic and transparent in the process.  It would stand to reason that the 
environment or tools establish to conduct the collaboration should be effective. 
Fifth, developing trust, respect, open communication, and a sense of equity were 
factors for success.  Hocevar and Jansen’s study of collaborative capacity for homeland 
security (2006) calls this organizational design component affecting collaboration “lateral 
mechanisms.”  This includes social capital (i.e., interpersonal networks), effective 
communication and information exchange, and technical interoperability as key success 
factors.  Likewise, the quality of the relationships involved is an important variable.  
Sixth, GAO found that stakeholders require sufficient time to provide to review 
policy artifacts in order to provide substantive input (GAO, 2011). 
However, according to Woodford’s research, there are factors that may inhibit 
collaborative government policy collaboration no matter what model is used to facilitate 
the collaborative process (2010).  First, the bureaucratic nature of government is poorly 
suited for collaboration.  Second, in his research, Woodford found that organizational 
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leaders represent community agencies, whereas individuals with no or very limited policy 
authority often represents government.  Third, related to the first, government staff may 
see collaboration as a technical process and possible as a way to neutralize community 
agencies’ policy change goals (Woodford, 2010).  Likewise, the barriers to collaboration 
can be the opposite of the success factors, for example, divergent goals, inadequate 
authority of participants, inadequate communication and information sharing, distrust, 
and so on.  For homeland security policy development at the White House, the first factor 
may be an inhibiter, however; the second one is not because the National Security Staff 
have the policy authority of the Office of the President.  The third factor could inhibit 
policy development unless the NSS is committed to developing a truly collaborative 
policy.   
In conclusion, this thesis evaluates the models against collaborative criteria. It 
looks at whether the models:  
• provide structured forums to discuss policy problems and agree on 
possible solutions;  
• include representation from many different jurisdictions and diverse 
stakeholders, providing for the widest, diverse input possible;  
• provide prescriptive requirements regarding group membership, decision-
making processes, and planning;  
• establishes transparency; establishes equality among local, state, federal 
government and private sector/NGO stakeholders with respect to 
consideration of policy input; and  
• provides sufficient time for stakeholders to review while giving White 
House policymakers sufficient flexibility within their tight time frames. 
B. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The literature review will be subdivided within the categories of research 
literature that were reviewed with respect to homeland security policy development and 
the inclusion or lack of inclusion of state, local, and tribal governments.  It will aim to 
identify the information about building a case for integration as well as solutions offered.  
These categories will be: (1) government reports, (2) journal articles, and (3) other 
sources such as scholar white papers and “think tank” reports.  
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1. Governmental Reports 
There are government reports, Congressional testimony, and legislative branch 
reports that discuss homeland security policy development and the need for state and 
local government involvement, especially as it relates to preparedness and response.  A 
report by Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, Full Minority Staff issued in August 
2003 identified that state and local officials wanted to have a seat at the table as the 
administration grapples with homeland security protection.  They also desired homeland 
security information that would allow them to deter, prevent, mitigate, prepare, and, if 
necessary, respond to acts of terrorism.  In other Congressional testimony, GAO 
discussed issues critical to successful federal leadership of, assistance to, and partnership 
with state and local governments to enhance homeland security (GAO, 2002).  One of the 
main points regarding success was that appropriate roles and responsibilities within and 
between the levels of government needed to be clarified; however, GAO did not offer any 
recommendations about how to accomplish the partnership. 
Additional Congressional testimony on five and 10 year Homeland Security 
Goals, Paul Stockton calls for horizontal integration across the 22 agencies within DHS 
as well as vertical integration between DHS and state and local partners (Stockton, 2007). 
He argues that collaborative relationships and processes will result in strategies, plans, 
and risk assessments that will be far superior to those developed strictly by federal staff 
(Stockton, 2007).  On the other hand, Corey Gruber, Director, Office for Policy 
Initiatives and Analysis, Office of State and Local Government Coordination and 
Preparedness, testified in 2005 that DHS is working very closely with state and local 
officials to develop a National Preparedness Goal, Universal Task List, and other national 
preparedness strategies (Gruber, 2005).  The question arises with respect to how effective 
was the coordination—were the state and local officials truly “at the table” and did the 
process used to develop these products with inclusion of state and locals work? The 
testimony does not provide evidence to answer those questions.   
In a Congressional Research Service (CRS) report on Homeland Security 
National Exercise Program, CRS reported similar concerns about the ability of federal, 
state and local entities working together to develop and then exercise homeland security 
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plans (Congressional Research Service, 2008).  The same report points out the lack of a 
clear connection between the National Exercise Program and state, territorial, local, and 
tribal government exercise programs. 
2. Journal Articles 
There have been numerous articles in the Homeland Security Affairs journal, 
mostly authored or co-authored by Paul Stockton (Roberts, 2008; Stockton, 2009) 
regarding integrating state and local governments into the national homeland security 
policy making.  Paul Stockton identifies many of the issues and also presents a solid case 
for the integration.  In all the literature reviewed, he is the only one that has provided a 
suggested solution to the problem with respect to “how to” perform this integration.  He 
advocates for state and local representation on the Homeland Security Council but raises 
a number of issues that may prevent the successful implementation of that solution 
(Stockton, 2006).  He does not provide a detailed concept of operations type solution to 
implement and test; however, Stockton does make the point that scholars and 
policymakers have only begun to examine how to take better advantage of state and local 
expertise in the policy making process (2006). 
In Findings from the Forum on Homeland Security after the Bush Administration: 
Next Steps in Building Unity of Effort (Roberts & Stockton, 2008), the authors define 
“unity of effort” and discuss the challenges to achieving it.  The two problems Roberts 
and Stockton present: (1) disagreement over the definition of homeland security and (2) 
the priorities that ought to drive homeland security.  The authors present additional 
suggestions on how to establish “unity of effort” in the homeland security policy realm.  
The recommendations fall in four areas. First, they make recommendations to change 
internal DHS organizational structures.  Second, with respect to Department of Defense, 
they recommend definitional changes. Third, with respect to states and localities, they 
make recommendations in two categories: changes within DHS and changes at the state 
and local levels to lessen their dependence on DHS. One recommendation in particular 
demonstrates the lack of specificity in the research regarding solutions to policy 
integration. They recommend improving the way that states and localities select their 
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representatives to provide input.  The authors do not elaborate on how this should be 
accomplished with the exception of saying that “the associations that represent states, 
localities, and other non-federal partners in homeland security need to organize 
themselves” (Roberts & Stockton, 2008).  Fourth and final recommendations were 
around the private sector and included an interesting idea that warrants research; the idea 
was to apply the sector partnership model to state and local governments. 
In his article “Federalism, Homeland Security and National Preparedness: A Case 
Study in the Development of Public Policy,” Sam Clovis agrees that homeland security is 
a national issue but recommends that state and local governments have maximum 
flexibility in implementing homeland security programs (Clovis, 2006).  He sees the 
federal government as providing facilitation and leadership.  This view seems contrary to 
one of working together on setting priorities. 
Finally, an article in the Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 
examines the determinants of sub-national vertical collaboration in two settings. (Mullin 
& Daley, 2009)  While this article deals with state and local collaboration, it 
demonstrates an area of research to further develop with respect to Federal and state/local 
interaction.   
3. Other Sources: Think Tank Reports, White Papers 
In the Gilmore Commission’s December 15, 2003 fifth and final annual report 
entitled Forging America’s New Normalcy: Securing Our Homeland, Protecting Our 
Liberty (Gilmore Commission, 2003), the authors lay out a “future vision” for 2009 that 
calls for states, localities, and private sector to be fully and consistently integrated into 
planning and decision making processes. The vision calls for the Homeland Security 
Council to engage “continuous, sustained, and well-organized dialogue with all levels of 
government, the private sector, and academia to develop a forward-looking vision of 
readiness efforts” (Gilmore Commission, 2003). While some of the elements of the entire 
vision have been achieved in the five-year time frame envisioned, many others have not, 
such as the sustained, well-organized dialogue. 
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In a 2006 Naval Postgraduate School thesis, Establishing a Homeland Security 
Field Structure (Dunn, 2006), the author recommends establishing a DHS field structure 
in order to provide a more effective approach to coordinating homeland security missions 
with state and local governments.  This recommendation was never implemented and 
may be worth investigating from a policy development perspective; however, 
assumptions and statements made in the paper are not valid or no longer true.  For 
example, there is no longer an Office of State and Local Government Coordination and 
Preparedness in DHS, and DHS did not complete or implement the concept of Federal 
Preparedness Coordinators in Urban Areas Security Initiative (UASI).  In addition, the 
proposed solution was aimed at engaging state, local, and tribal governments in planning, 
information sharing, and analysis not specifically for providing state and locals the ability 
to influence federal preparedness policy. 
In a 2007 report, the Homeland Security Advisory Council recommended that the 
Secretary conduct a Quadrennial Homeland Security Review consulting with federal, 
state and local governments (Homeland Security Advisory Council, 2007), but it does not 
specify the best method to achieve that goal.  A more recent article in the Backgrounder, 
a Heritage Foundation periodical (Baca, 2010), builds a case for state and locals to 
participate in the federal homeland security process. While it commends DHS’ outreach 
efforts during the quadrennial homeland security review, it stated the process was 
“immature, inefficient, and of doubtful value”(Baca, 2010).  It did not provide sufficient 
evidence to back up that claim. However, the article proposed another possible solution 
for inclusion of state and locals in the federal policy process—suggesting that the 
President issue an executive order to give states and localities a seat at the federal policy 
table, add representatives to the National Security Council Interagency Policy 
Committees, and make them equal partners with federal agencies. However, again, the 
fine details to accomplish this solution are absent from the literature. 
The Heritage Foundation’s article touched on federalism, as does some of the 
other literature.  In a Homeland Security Affairs article entitled “Federalism, Homeland 
Security and National Preparedness: A Case Study in the Development of Public Policy,”  
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the author explores the relationship between federalism and homeland security national 
preparedness (Clovis, 2006).  The author goes on to recommend a framework of 
“Collaborative Federalism” for homeland security. 
A review of material published by the U.S. Army War College (thesis paper) and 
its Strategic Studies Institute (monographs) showed that significant research has been 
conducted on the interagency process as it relates to national security and post-conflict 
nation building and reconstruction (Bartholomees, 2010).  In his paper Interagency 
Reform for the 21st Century, Gregg Gross points out that the 2002 National Security 
Strategy contained the implicit requirement to improve interagency organization and 
processes (2006).  He cites numerous examples of Presidential Directives and 
government-sponsored reports calling for interagency reform to manage the National 
Security environment that has changed since the cold war and even more importantly 
since 9/11 (Gross, 2006).  Similarly, and more recently, the Iraq and Afghanistan wars 
have shed light on the need to have interagency cooperation for reconstruction efforts in 
both countries.  In Volume II of the U.S. Army War College Guide to National Security 
Issues, an entire chapter is dedicated to national security and the interagency process 
(Marcella, 2010).   
All these documents reviewed focused mainly on national security and overseas 
operations and the requirement for interagency coordination and reform of those 
processes.  While some of the research and recommendations may be applied to the 
homeland security environment, the research does not cover the breadth and depth of the 
homeland security environment and its stakeholders.  Most of the papers apply to the 
DoD and the State Department and the need to bring in additional Departments such as 
Treasury, Agriculture and Commerce.  The homeland security environment includes 
those departments plus many other federal departments, 56 states and territories, and 
87,000 local jurisdictions (Bush, 2002 p. vii).   
4. Summary of Literature Review Findings 
In summary, while the literature review shows that there is a strong need and 
desire for state, local, tribal, and federal governments working together to develop 
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homeland security policy and strategies, it does not present an innovative, integrated 
national policy and strategy process that would enable the country to better address 
complex homeland security environment. According to the literature researched, most 
concluded that when developing homeland security policy and strategies, including 
follow-on implementation plans, procedures, systems and requirements, the White House 
National Security Staff and federal interagency homeland security leaders have not 
adequately incorporated state, local, tribal, and private sector homeland security and 
emergency management personnel into the policy development process. 
To address these shortcomings, this thesis will provide an overview of current 
models used to incorporate state and local input into national homeland security policy.  
It will also provide an evaluation of the different models and ultimately a 
recommendation for a model for integrated homeland security policy development for the 
White House National Security Staff. 
Since the National Security Strategy was issued in 2007, there has been an interest 
from the federal side to include state and local input into homeland security policy and 
plans.  Some ideas have been presented on how to best accomplish this task; however, the 
literature has not put forward a specific model.  In addition, the literature is devoid of a 
comparison between alternative policy options and the current homeland security policy 
development model. 
Prior to 9-11, it was not necessary for local, state, tribal and federal government 
entities to work together in an integrated manner.  As more man-made threats are 
identified and natural disasters are experienced, and national strategies are developed to 
mitigate them, state, local, tribal, private sector and non-governmental entities will be 
part of the implementation of those strategies therefore; they need to be part of their 
development.  This research is timely as the homeland security enterprise matures. 
The next three chapters will provide a description and review of the models 
selected.  The model will be described and evaluated against the criteria.  In addition, if 
the model was evaluated by an outside entity, that analysis is also included.  The final 
two chapters include a summary of the analysis and the conclusions of the research. 
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III. CURRENT HOMELAND SECURITY POLICY PROCESS 
A. HISTORY 
1. Early National Security Coordination 
National security decision and policymaking processes are critical to the 
management of the national security interests of the United States.  Historically, the 
national security policymaking process is based on analysis of the international situation, 
including diplomatic, economic, intelligence, and military factors. Based on a 
comprehensive assessment, the President’s administration implements its national 
security policy by using the most appropriate instrument of policy—military, diplomatic, 
economic, based on the intelligence services, or a combination thereof (Best, 2011).  
Prior to the twentieth century, the President of the United States was the primary 
coordinator of national security policy.  
The Constitution designates the President as Commander-in-Chief of the armed 
forces (Article II, Section 2) and grants him broad powers in the areas of foreign affairs 
(Article II, Section 2).  Prior to the twentieth century, the President typically coordinated 
policy development and implementation with his cabinet.  This was due to the fact that 
the U.S. had limited foreign involvements, small number of armed forces, relative 
geographic isolation, and no proximate threat.  The U.S. followed non-interventionism 
policies starting with George Washington and continuing throughout the nineteenth 
century; however, this changed with the start of World War I. 
Because the war was the most complex military effort that the U.S. had faced in a 
long time, it involved both domestic and international coordination and the President 
could not perform all coordination required alone. In 1916, the Army Appropriation Act 
of 1916 established the Council of National Defense, which consisted of the Secretaries 
of War, Navy, Interior, Agriculture, Commerce and Labor. The Council was intended as 
an economic mobilization-coordinating group.  While considered a national security 
initiative, the inclusion of Departments such as Labor, Commerce, Agriculture, and 
Interior could be construed as the first elements of homeland security whereby domestic-
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based departments contributed to policy and efforts to protect the United States. The 
Council was disbanded in 1921, but it set a precedent for coordinative efforts that would 
be needed in World War II (Best, 2011). 
The President remained the sole national security coordinator until April 1938 
when, due to prewar crisis presenting threats and challenges to the U.S., President 
Franklin Roosevelt approved a proposal by Secretary of State Cordell Hull to create a 
standing committee made up of the Under Secretary of State, the Chief of Staff of the 
Army, and the Chief of Naval Operations, for purposes of liaison and coordination (Best, 
2011). The Standing Liaison Committee was the first significant effort toward 
interdepartmental liaison and coordination. In 1945, Roosevelt created the State, War, 
Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC), which had its own secretariat and a number of 
regional and topical subcommittees. SWNCC operated through the end of the war and 
beyond. 
2. The Creation of the National Security Council 
The National Security Council was created as part of a larger reorganization of 
the United States national security structure established by the National Security Act of 
1947.  The legislation also established the Central Intelligence agency headed by the 
Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) and a National Military Establishment under the 
Secretary of Defense. 
The NSC appears in Section 101 of Title I, Coordination for National Security, 
and its purpose is stated as follows: 
(a) ... The function of the Council shall be to advise the President with 
respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies 
relating to the national security so as to enable the military services and 
the other departments and agencies of the Government to cooperate more 
effectively in matters involving the national security. 
(b) In addition to performing such other functions as the President may 
direct, for the purpose of more effectively coordinating the policies and 
functions of the departments and agencies of the Government relating to 
the national security, it shall, subject to the direction of the President, be 
the duty of the Council 
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(1) to assess and appraise the objectives, commitments, and risks of the 
United States in relation to our actual and potential military power, in the 
interest of national security, for the purpose of making recommendations 
to the President in connection there with; and 
(2) to consider policies on matters of common interest to the departments 
and agencies of the Government concerned with the national security, and 
to make recommendations to the President in connection therewith. . . . 
(d) The Council shall, from time to time, make such recommendations, 
and such other reports to the President as it deems appropriate or as the 
President may require. (50 USC 402) 
Statutory members of the NSC established by the act included: the President; the 
Secretaries of State, Defense, Army, Navy, Air Force; and the Chairman of the National 
Security Resources Board.  The President was given the ability to designate other cabinet 
members and officers as members from time to time but further expansion of NSC 
required Senate approval.  In 1949, amendments to the National Security Act changed the 
membership of the NSC to the President, Vice President, Secretaries of State and 
Defense, and Chairman of the National Security Resources Board and it made the NSC 
part of the Executive Office of the President. 
President Truman did not routinely use the NSC until the Korean War outbreak in 
1950.  During that time, Truman established many of the procedures that remain today, 
including interagency committees with responsibilities for specific regional and 
functional areas, analysis and development of policy options, and recommendations for 
Presidential decisions.  
The NSC expanded and contracted in size and function during the administrations 
from Eisenhower through Reagan.  President Eisenhower institutionalized and expanded 
the NSC; he created the position of Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, a 
position that remains today.  He “saw the NSC process as one which produced a 
consensus within the Administration which would lead to effective policy 
implementation” (Best, 2011, p. 10).  On the other hand, President Kennedy did not value 
the formal NSC procdures and reduced the size of the NSC to its statutory requirement 
and the staff work was done mainly by some departments and ad hoc task forces.  
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President Johnson followed Kenndey’s NSC structure.  President Nixon, having been 
associated with the Eisenhower Administration, expaned the NSC and had a staff 
strucuture that resembled Eisenhower’s.  President Ford kept most of Nixon’s NSC 
structure.  However, under President Carter, the NSC was again contracted, reducing the 
number of NSC staff and comittees.  President Reagan relied more on departmental 
leadership from State, Defense, and CIA instead of the NSC staff.  The Reagan NSC has 
been criticized for having major limitations (Best, 2011). 
The George H. W. Bush administration established the NSC structure that has 
essentially remained through the subsequent administrations right up to today’s Obama 
administration.  President George H. W. Bush issued National Security Directive 1 
(NSD-1) that established three NSC sub-groups. The NSC Principals Committee was 
composed of the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence 
(DCI,) the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), the Chief of Staff to the President, 
and the National Security Adviser, who was the Chairman. The NSC Deputies 
Committee, chaired by the Deputy National Security Adviser, was composed of second-
ranking officials. There were also a number of NSC Policy Coordinating Committees, 
chaired by senior officials of the departments most directly concerned with NSC staff 
members serving as executive secretaries (Best, 2011).  Because of his often-stated focus 
on domestic and economic policy priorities during the Presidential campaign, President 
Clinton’s Presidential Decision Directive 2 expanded the NSC to include advisors 
including the Secretary of the Treasury, the U.S. Representative to the Unite Nations, the 
Assistant to the President for Economic Policy and the Chief of Staff to the President.  
President George W. Bush issued National Security Presidential Directive-1, 
“Organization of the National Security Council System.” The NSPD stated that the NSC 
system was to advise and assist the President and “coordinate executive departments and 
agencies in the effective development and implementation” of national security policies 
(Bush, 2001).  President Bush kept the same structure with a Principals Committee 
consisting of cabinet members, Deputies Committee consisting of Deputy Secretaries, 
and Policy Coordinating Committees attended by Assistant Secretaries. He added the 
Attorney General as a participating member of the NSC.  Finally, President Obama kept 
 25 
the same structure but added the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Counsel to the 
President as members who would participate in NSC deliberations (White House, 2009). 
President Obama issued his Presidential Policy Directive-1, Organization of the 
National Security Council System (Obama, 2009). Besides listing those who will 
participate in NSC deliberations, it makes reference to officials who will be specifically 
invited to sessions dealing with international economic affairs, homeland security, 
counterterrorism, and science and technology issues. It describes the membership and 
duties of the Principals and Deputies Committees, which are to be chaired by the 
National Security Adviser and the Deputy National Security Adviser, respectively. The 
Principals Committee will be the “senior interagency forum for consideration of policy 
issues affecting national security” while the Deputies Committee will “review and 
monitor the work of the NSC interagency process” and “shall be responsible for day-to-
day crisis management” (Obama, 2009). 
In the wake of the attacks of September 11, 2001, President Bush established, and 
President Obama maintained the Homeland Security Council to “ensure coordination of 
all homeland security-related activities among executive departments and agencies and 
promote the effective development and implementation of all homeland security policies” 
(Bush, 2001).  The HSC was largely modeled after the NSC; therefore, the subsequent 
sections will describe the structure and policy processes of each, with the HSC section 
emphasizing differences from the NSC. 
3. The Structure of the NSC 
The National Security Advisor is the President’s personal advisor, not subject to 
Senate confirmation, responsible for the daily management of national security affairs for 
the President. The President alone decides national security policy, but the National 
Security Advisor is responsible for ensuring that: 
• The President has all the necessary information, 
• A full range of policy options have been identified,  
• The prospects and risks of each option have been evaluated,  
• Legal considerations have been addressed,  
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• Difficulties in implementation have been identified, and  
• All NSC principals have been included in the development process 
(Whittaker, 2010, p. 13).  The National Security Staff assist the National 
Security Advisor in carrying out his/her duties. 
Historically, it is uncommon for NSC meetings to be held that are chaired by the 
President with all members in attendance.  Instead, NSC staff manages national security 
affairs through direct meetings with cabinet officers and key advisors, and through a 
series of committees with defined responsibilities and subject areas.  The requested 
attendees to National Security Council meetings have been based on the leadership style 
of the President and whom he wants to attend for advice on issues.  For example, 
President Obama issued Presidential Decision Directive-1 defining his national security 
structure and he includes, besides the statutory members: the Secretary of the Treasury, 
the Attorney General, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Representative of the 
United States of America to the United Nations, the Assistant to the President and Chief 
of Staff (Chief of Staff to the President), and the Assistant to the President for National 
Security Affairs (National Security Advisor).  Other regular attendees include: the 
Director of National Intelligence (as a statutory advisor) and the Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff (as a statutory advisor).  In addition, President Obama will invite 
attendees on specific topic areas.  For example, invitees when international economic 
issues are on the agenda: the Secretary of Commerce; the United States Trade 
Representative; the Assistant to the President for Economic Policy; and the Chair of the 
Council of Economic Advisers. 
Starting with the first Bush administration, the NSC has been supported by three 
interagency structures: the Principals Committee (PC), the Deputies Committee (DC), 
and Interagency Policy Committees (IPC).1  The PC is essentially the NSC without the 
President and Vice President. The National Security Advisor presides over the PC, which 
meets on a regular basis to consider policy recommendations from the DC and IPCs.  The  
 
 
                                                 
1 Under the Bush administrations, these were called Policy Coordination Committees (PCC) and under 
the Clinton administration they were called Interagency Working Groups (IWG). 
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PC will approve policy, handle contentious interagency disputes about proposed policy, 
and/or provide direction to the DC and IPCs to perform follow-up work or refine the 
policy developed or to develop implementation plans.  
The DC, made up of deputy secretary level officials, is responsible for directing 
the work of interagency working groups and ensuring that issues brought before the PC 
or the NSC have been properly analyzed and prepared for high-level deliberation 
(Whittaker, 2010). President Obama codified this responsibility for the DC in Presidential 
Policy Directive 1, Organization of the National Security Council System, by directing 
that: 
NSC/DC shall ensure that all papers to be discussed by the NSC or the 
NSC/PC fully analyze the issues, fairly and adequately set out the facts, 
consider a full range of views and options, and satisfactorily assess the 
prospects, risks, and implications of each. (Obama, 2009)   
PPD-1 also states that the DC be “responsible for day-to-day crisis management” 
(Obama, 2009).  Historically, the DC is where the bulk of the government’s policy 
decisions are made in preparation for the PC’s review and the President’s decision 
(Whittaker, 2010). 
Subordinate to the DC are a variety of interagency working groups called 
Interagency Policy Committees (IPCs).  These interagency committees are composed of 
subject matter experts and Assistant Secretary or equivalent level officials from the 
departments and agencies represented on the DC.  IPC-type committees are the main 
forums for interagency coordination. In the Clinton administration, they were considered 
“the heart and soul of the process” (Marcella, 2010).  While subtle differences exist 
across administrations, the IPC type committees are standing, ad hoc, regional or 
functional committees who meet regularly to assess routine and crisis issues, frame 
policy responses, and build consensus across the government for action (Marcella, 2010). 
During the second term of the Bush administration and during the first years of 
the Obama administration, IPCs have been delegated greater responsibility for policy 
development to permit deputies and principals to focus on the most critical issues, 
therefore, they are expected to reach consensus prior to submitting policy to the DC level. 
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4. The Creation of the Homeland Security Council 
President George W. Bush issued Executive Order 13228 establishing the Office 
of Homeland Security and the Homeland Security Council (HSC) on October 8, 2001 in 
response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. It stated that the mission of the 
Office was to “develop and coordinate the implementation of a comprehensive national 
strategy to secure the United States from terrorist threats or attacks” (Bush, 2001).  The 
HSC, “responsible for advising and assisting the President with respect to all aspects of 
homeland security,” was required to “serve as the mechanism for ensuring coordination 
of homeland security-related activities of executive departments and agencies and 
effective development and implementation of homeland security policies” (Bush, 2001).  
It also serves as the President’s principal forum for reviewing homeland security policy 
matters with his senior national security advisors and cabinet officials.  President Bush 
followed the E.O. 13228 with Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD)-1 on 
October 29, 2001; the HSPD established the organization and operation of the HSC, 
which was later codified in the Homeland Security Act of 2002. 
One of the reasons President Bush established the HSC was due to domestic 
security concerns. While acknowledging that there is an international dimension, the 
homeland security mission is inherently different from the traditional national security 
mission.   In addition, homeland security has vastly different and more stakeholders such 
as 25-plus federal departments and agencies and state, local, tribal, and territorial 
governments as well as the private sector and non-governmental organizations (NGOs).  
National security, on the other hand, has always involved advising the president on 
foreign policy and involved a small circle of federal players such as Department of 
Defense, Department of State, and the Central Intelligence Agency. 
The Obama Administration has retained the membership of the HSC as specified 
in the executive order and HSPD-1.  The members are: 
…the President, the Vice President, the Secretary of the Treasury, the 
Secretary of Defense, Secretary of Homeland Security, the Attorney 
General, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, the Secretary of 
Transportation, the Director of the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Director 
 29 
of Central Intelligence, the Assistant to the President for Homeland 
Security, and such other officers of the executive branch as the President 
may from time to time designate. The Chief of Staff, the Chief of Staff to 
the Vice President, the Assistant to the President for National Security 
Affairs, the Counsel to the President, and the Director of the Office of 
Management and Budget also are invited to attend any Council meeting. 
The Secretary of State, the Secretary of Agriculture, the Secretary of the 
Interior, the Secretary of Energy, the Secretary of Labor, the Secretary of 
Commerce, the Secretary of Veterans Affairs, the Administrator of the 
Environmental Protection Agency, the Assistant to the President for 
Economic Policy, and the Assistant to the President for Domestic Policy 
shall be invited to attend meetings pertaining to their responsibilities. The 
heads of other executive departments and agencies and other senior 
officials shall be invited to attend Council meetings when appropriate. 
(Bush, 2001) 
The support structure of the HSC mirrors that of the NSC in that it overseen by a 
Deputy National Security Advisor called the Assistant to the President for Homeland 
Security and Counterterrorism (APHS/CT) and there are the PC, DC, and IPCs.  The PC 
of the HSC is organized as the senior interagency forum for homeland security issues, 
and it meets whenever necessary. Individual PC members meet on regular basis with each 
other to discuss developments and policy issues. Regular members of the HSC/PC 
include the:  
• Vice President,  
• Secretary of Homeland Security,  
• Secretary of the Treasury, Secretary of Defense,  
• Attorney General,  
• Secretary of Health and Human Services,  
• Secretary of Transportation,  
• Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation,  
• Director of National Intelligence,  
• Director of the Office of Management and Budget,  
• APHS/CT,  
• Chief of Staff to the President, and  
• Chief of Staff to the Vice President.   
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The APHS/CT or other senior staff chair the meetings, and the National Security 
Advisor and the Counsel to the President are invited to attend all meetings. Other key 
Executive Branch officials may be called to attend HSC/Principals Committee meetings 
when issues related to their areas of responsibility are discussed. These invitees may 
include the Secretaries of State, Interior, Commerce, Agriculture, Labor, Energy, 
Veterans Affairs, and the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency 
(Whittaker, 2010). 
The HSC system also has a Deputies Committee (HSC/DC). The role of the 
HSC/DC is to ensure that matters brought before the HSC or HSC/PC have been properly 
analyzed, reviewed by key interagency stakeholders, and prepared for action (Whittaker, 
2010). The HSC/DC meets on a regular basis to oversee homeland security issues and 
manage breaking incidents. The regular members of the HSC/DC include the:  
• Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security,  
• Deputy Secretary of the Treasury,  
• Deputy Secretary of Defense,  
• Deputy Attorney General,  
• Deputy Secretary of Transportation, Deputy  
• Secretary of Health and Human Services,  
• Deputy Director of National Intelligence,  
• Deputy Directors of the Office of Management and Budget, and  
• FBI.  
The Deputy Assistant to the President for Homeland Security chairs the HSC/DC 
meetings. The Deputy National Security Advisor, Deputy Chief of Staff to the President, 
and Deputy Chief of Staff to the Vice President are invited to attend all meetings.  Other 
officials may be invited to attend HSC/DC meetings when issues pertaining to their 
department’s scope of responsibilities are involved, including Deputy Secretaries of 
State, Interior, Commerce, Agriculture, Labor, Energy, Veterans Affairs, and the 
Environmental Protection Agency.  
The HSC also has subordinate IPCs and sub-IPCs that are attended by Assistant 
Secretary or equivalent level and Deputy Assistant Secretary or equivalent participants 
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respectively from the departments and agencies that make up the HSC deputies.  For 
some IPCs, such as the Domestic Resilience Group (DRG) that handles response and 
preparedness issues, the membership may be slightly larger to account for the number of 
departments and agencies involved with those issues.  The attendees are expected to be 
able to speak on behalf of their departments and agencies and provide resources.  The 
HSC IPCs and sub-IPCs are the keystone of homeland security policy development and 
coordination, typically providing the first in-depth, broad interagency review and 
discussion of proposals or initiatives; they also provide policy analysis and 
recommendations for the HSC DC and PC.  Most IPCs meet on a weekly basis. 
In the post 9/11 security environment, U.S. national security and homeland 
security have large areas of overlapping responsibilities. Homeland security focuses on 
terrorist attacks within the U.S. by foreign interests, factions, and domestic groups not 
affiliated with external organizations or nations, as well as public safety events that occur 
within U.S. borders (Whittaker, 2010).  National security also focuses on foreign interests 
and factions.  As a result, in February 2009, President Obama issued Presidential Study 
Directive-1 that directed:  
…the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and 
Counterterrorism to lead an interagency review of ways to reform the 
White House organization for counter-terrorism and homeland security in 
order to strengthen the Government's ability to craft and implement sound 
policies designed to keep our country secure and our citizens safe. 
(Obama, 2009) 
As a result of the study, President Obama integrated the NSC Staff and the HSC 
Staff creating the National Security Staff.  This staff is responsible for supporting the 
National Security Advisor and the APHS/CT in their policy development roles and 
usually presides over the IPCs and sub-IPCs.   
President Obama retained the HSC as the “principal venue for interagency 
deliberations on the issues that affect the security of the homeland such as terrorism, 
weapons of mass destruction, natural disasters, and pandemic influenza” (White House 
Office of Press Secretary, 2009).  Issues affecting the security of the homeland include a 
full range of transnational issues that threaten the country, including weapons of mass 
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destruction, cyber attacks, terrorism, pandemic influenza, and catastrophic national 
disasters, such as Hurricanes Katrina and Rita that struck the U.S. Gulf coast in August 
and September of 2005, and the May 2010 Gulf of Mexico oil spill.  In addition, because 
the Homeland Security Council was codified in the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 
USC 491), President Obama cannot not eliminate the HSC without Congressional action. 
5. The HSC Policy Process 
As previously stated, the primary role of the Homeland Security Council and the 
APHS/CT is to advise the President on homeland security and counterterrorism matters. 
Since 9-11, homeland security has become a critical part of overall national security and 
increasingly has both national and international dimensions.  In President Bush’s 2007 
National Strategy for Homeland Security (Strategy), homeland security was defined as “a 
concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce 
American’s vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize the damage and recover from attacks 
that do occur” (Bush, 2007).  The Strategy emphasizes leveraging a wide range of 
instruments of national power and influence “to prevent terrorism, protect the lives and 
livelihoods of the American people, and respond to and recover from incidents” (Bush, 
2007, pp. 49–50).  In the years since its creation, the HSC has taken an “all hazards” 
approach to its mission of protecting the U.S. homeland from harm.  As such, homeland 
security policy involves a wide range of U.S. government agencies (at all levels of 
government) and the private sector engaged in countering threats and protecting the 
country both at home and abroad. 
The policy process for the HSC has followed the long-standing policy process 
used by the NSC.  The National Security Advisor is responsible for the daily 
management of homeland security affairs for the President and has delegated a large part 
of that responsibility to the APHS/CT. He/she is responsible for ensuring that: 
• the President has all the necessary information, 
• a full range of policy options have been identified,  
• the prospects and risks of each option have been evaluated,  
• legal considerations have been addressed,  
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• difficulties in implementation have been identified, and  
• all HSC principals have been included in the policy development process.   
Based on Presidential priorities, the APHS sets the strategic agenda for the 
administration’s homeland security efforts that will be worked by the IPCs, DC, and PC.   
Once the President via the National Security Advisor provides direction to 
develop policy to address a homeland security issue, the current homeland security 
development process involves the National Security Staff (NSS) developing proposed 
policy documents usually within a sub-interagency policy committee (sub-IPC).  The 
interagency body refines the policy, conducts a review within members’ individual 
agency, submits the comments to the NSS, the NSS adjudicates the comments, and 
refines the policy.  This process can take days, weeks, months, or even years, depending 
on the complexity of the topic and the scope of the policy document being developed and 
the ability of the interagency to reach consensus.  Once the NSS adjudicates the 
comments, the group discusses these and members plead their case if they disagree on 
how the comment was adjudicated. 
The policy is then submitted to the Interagency Policy Committee that conducts a 
similar process.  The IPC will focus on the issues where the interagency does not agree or 
where resource requirements to support the policy may be lacking or contentious.  The 
group will also consider any implementation challenges.  If consensus is reached, the 
documents can be finalized at this level and issued, or it can be passed up to the DC for 
review and approval.  The DC will review a policy in two ways: first, the Deputy 
APHS/CT can hold a meeting to discuss; or second, the policy will be sent via what is 
called “paper deputies.” “Paper deputies” are generally used for a document that is not 
controversial. The HSC Executive Secretariat will send the document to the various 
departments for Deputies to review and provide written approval usually by email. If the 
DC approves the policy, many times it will go directly to the President for signature.  
However, if there are still unresolved issues or conflicts with the policy, then it will be 
sent to the Principals Committee for review and discussion.  In 2008, there were over 325 
in-person Deputy meetings and additional paper deputies on top of that. 
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Prior to review by the President and subsequent decision the PC will meet and 
approve policy that is usually final coming out of the Deputies Committee.  If there are 
particular interagency disagreements remaining, the PC will adjudicate the issue prior to 
recommending a policy to the President for his signature.  Again, not all policy reaches 
the PC or the President’s level unless it is a major policy document such as a HSPD or a 
national strategy. 
The HSC under President Bush developed 25 Homeland Security Presidential 
Directives for his signature (see Appendix A for the list of directives). These policies 
ranged from combating weapons of mass destruction to managing domestic incidents to 
maritime security strategy. 
In addition, the HSC and the interagency prepared and approved over 15 other 
national homeland security strategies and policies. For example, strategies related to 
national preparedness include the overarching National Strategy for Homeland Security 
(July 2002, revised in October 2007), along with 11 “subject-specific” strategies issued 
through the Homeland or National Security Councils. A list of these strategies and plans 
can be found in Appendix A. 
B. ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT HSC POLICY MAKING MODEL 
1. Examples of Where It Has Worked and Where It Has Not Worked 
In order to address homeland security priorities, the HSC recommends policies to 
the President that integrate various departmental and agency perspectives and have been 
coordinated across the federal government using the HSC policy process established in 
HSPD-1 and described in the previous section.  Because the 9-11 paradigm replaced the 
traditional nation-state threat, such as the Soviet Union with non-state actors like al-
Qaeda, and replaced the tools of war with suicide bombers, state and local governments 
and the private sector will take on more responsibilities to prevent, protect, respond, and 
recover from terrorist attacks (Baca, 2010).  This shift from a federally led national 




Defense, and the CIA to homeland security environment where the key actors are over 30 
federal departments and agencies as well as state, local, and tribal governments requires a 
different policy process.   
It was recognized early on that these policies should be coordinated with state and 
local governments, as well as appropriate entities in the private sector; however, there are 
no representatives from local or state governments or the private sector on the HSC or the 
IPCs. GAO called for state, local, and private sector integration as early as April 2002 
when it issued its testimony National Preparedness: Integration of Federal, State, Local, 
and Private Sector Efforts is Critical to an Effective National Strategy for Homeland 
Security.  The departments and agency participants on the IPCs are expected to socialize 
policy with their constituents.  As an example, DHS and FEMA have taken the lead in 
working preparedness and response policy issues with the local and state governments 
and private sector while Department of Justice and the Director of National Intelligence 
work prevention and protection policy issues with constituents.  The processes used to 
socialize policy and gather input from the over 87,000 jurisdictions that are part of the 
homeland security environment are not well documented and are not standardized in the 
interagency and non-existent at the Homeland Security Council (Bush, 2002). 
In 2001, President Bush’s Chief of Staff Andrew Card promised that state and 
local governments would be represented on the council (Stockton, 2008); however, that 
never happened.  Instead, Bush established the Homeland Security Advisory Council, 
which included state and local and private sector officials, to make recommendations to 
the HSC.  The panel is purely advisory and does not participate in IPCs or DC/PC 
deliberations.  There is no evidence that their recommendations were incorporated into 
policy.   
From a positive perspective, DHS developed task forces and advisory bodies that 
included state and local representation.  DHS, as is required for other federal agencies, 
uses tools such as the “notice of proposed rule making,” to provide an opportunity for 
state and local governments to comment when it adds, removes, or changes a regulation 
(Baca, 2010).  DHS has also created a new state and local outreach office and other sate 
and local working groups to increase stakeholder outreach.  As will be discussed later in 
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this thesis, during its Quadrennial Homeland Security Review, DHS established an 
information technology platform and a facilitated process to allow state and local 
homeland security professionals—first responders and first preventers—to participate in 
shaping the homeland security review (2010).  While these efforts are a start, many 
experienced homeland security professionals and scholars do not believe that these 
initiatives have fundamentally altered the national policymaking structure in Washington, 
D.C.  The HSC and DHS do not fully represent the equities and resources outside of the 
federal government (Baca, 2010). 
Another example of where the HSC policy process should have included state and 
local input into policy was the development and the implementation of HSPD-5 
Management of Domestic Incidents and HSPD-8 National Preparedness. Because there 
was no state or local representation on the HSC, these two directives were developed by 
the federal interagency.  The purpose of HSPD 5 was “to enhance the ability of the 
United States to manage domestic incidents by establishing a single, comprehensive 
national incident management system” (Bush, 2003).  It also established the policy 
requiring that the U.S. government “ensure that all levels of government across the 
Nation have the capability to work efficiently and effectively together” and established 
the Secretary of DHS as the “principal Federal official for domestic incident 
management” and required DHS to develop a comprehensive National Response Plan” 
(Bush, 2003).  Similarly, HSPD-8 stated (Bush, 2003): 
To help ensure the preparedness of the Nation to prevent, respond to, and 
recover from threatened and actual domestic terrorist attacks, major 
disasters, and other emergencies, the Secretary, in coordination with the 
heads of other appropriate Federal departments and agencies and in 
consultation with State and local governments, shall develop a national 
domestic all-hazards preparedness goal.   
Both directives provide national policy that impacts non-federal stakeholders and 
would have benefited from their perspective when they were developed.  
Similarly, in the implementation of HSPD-5 and HSPD-8, input from nonfederal 
stakeholders, such as state and local governments, nonprofit groups, and the private 
sector, was poorly integrated into the artifacts required by the HSPDs (CRS, 2008).  
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Congress even tried to ensure input by addressing the issue in Section 653 of the Post-
Katrina Act, where Congress required DHS and FEMA to develop operational plans with 
state, local, and tribal government officials (42 U.S.C. 753).  According to a June 2008 
GAO report, National Response Framework: FEMA needs Policies and Procedures to 
Better Integrate Non-Federal Stakeholders in the Revision Process, DHS initially 
included nonfederal stakeholder input in the creation of the NRF but later “deviated” 
from the process.  Rather than disseminating the first draft of the NRF to federal and 
nonfederal stakeholders, DHS conducted an internal review of the document. GAO found 
that the issuance of a later draft to nonfederal stakeholders was delayed, reducing the 
amount of time for the stakeholders to respond with comments on the draft (GAO 2008). 
Additionally, GAO reported that DHS failed to establish FEMA’s National Advisory 
Council (NAC) by the December 2006 deadline that was set forth in Section 508 of the 
Post-Katrina Act. According to the act, the NAC is responsible for incorporating the 
input of state, local, and tribal governments and the private sector in the development and 
revision of the NRF.  GAO recommended that, for future NRF revisions, FEMA should 
issues policies and procedures that clearly describe how FEMA will integrate all 
stakeholders, including the NAC and other non-federal stakeholders (GAO, 2008). 
Another example of where non-federal stakeholder involvement was necessary 
but was not complete was in the HSC’s development of The National Strategy for 
Pandemic Influenza (National Pandemic Strategy) and The Implementation Plan for the 
National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza (National Pandemic Implementation Plan), 
which was issued in November 2005 and May 2006 by the President and the HSC (GAO, 
2008).  Key non-federal stakeholders, such as state and local governments, were not 
directly involved in the development of the documents even though these stakeholders 
were expected to be primary responders to an influenza pandemic.   
Federal coordination with state, local, and tribal governments and other 
stakeholders is necessary to produce effective homeland security strategies that result in 
successful outcomes.  For example, the re-write of the National Response Plan had little 
state and local input and, as a result, the first real test of the NRP—the response to 
Hurricane Katrina—was extremely ineffective.  In its Hurricane Katrina Lessons 
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Learned report, the White House said that the storm demonstrated the need for greater 
integration and synchronization of preparedness efforts, not only throughout the federal 
government, but also with state and local governments and the private and non-profit 
sectors as well (U.S, Executive Office of the President, 2006, p. 50).  In another example, 
the President Obama issued Executive Order 13257 of December 30, 2009, Establishing 
Federal Capability for the Timely Provision of Medical Countermeasures Following a 
Biological Attack.  (Obama, 2009) The order specifically calls for the development of (1) 
a national U.S. Postal Service medical countermeasures dispensing model for U.S cities 
to respond to a large-scale biological attack, with anthrax as the primary threat 
consideration and (2) a federal rapid response capability to dispense medical 
countermeasures to an affected population following a biological attack.  However, 
because the states and locals were not consulted on this executive order, city officials 
from Chicago, San Francisco, and Los Angles all pushed back on the concept during 
federally sponsored exercises in 2010 and 2011.  These cities are developing different 
plans for a medical counter measure (MCM) response and as a result, in a real event, the 
response may not be well coordinated or executed and loss of life could result. 
However, there were three areas where the HSC process did work well with 
respect to the National Pandemic Strategy and Implementation Plan.  First, there was a 
high degree of federal interagency participation in the development of these documents 
and the resulting 300 plus artifacts resulting from the implementation plan.  The 
Pandemic IPC met at least weekly for almost three years and contained over 25 regular 
members attending.  All members had to approve all actions that were taken, which 
resulted in an unprecedented level of teamwork never seen in an IPC up until that point. 
Second, the HSC provided a high level of transparency into the pandemic preparedness 
and response plans through issuance of these two detailed documents.  The GAO called 
the documents “an important first step in guiding the nation’s preparedness and response 
activities, calling for a series of actions by federal agencies and expectations for states 
and communities, the private sector, global partners, and individuals” (GAO, 2007).  
Thirdly, the IPC conducted a thorough review of all 53 states’ and territories’ pandemic 
plans and provided written feedback to ensure the plans were meeting the intent of the 
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National Pandemic Strategy.  This level of engagement with the states by an IPC was 
unprecedented, and it resulted in the states having better plans and more buy-in to the 
pandemic planning process. 
2. Evaluation Against Criteria 
This section evaluates the current HSC policy development process against the 
criteria established in the methodology. It looks at whether or not the model: 
• provides structured routine forums to discuss policy problems and agree 
on possible solutions;  
• includes representation from many different jurisdictions and diverse 
stakeholders providing for the widest, diverse input possible;  
• provides prescriptive requirements regarding group membership, decision-
making processes, and planning; establishes transparency;  
• establishes equality among federal members with respect to consideration 
of policy input; and  
• provides timeliness- the model provides sufficient time for stakeholders to 
review while giving NSS sufficient flexibility within their tight time 
frames. 
Because homeland security involves domestic issues, HSC coordination 
challenges involve wide range of Executive Branch agencies, state, local, and tribal 
governments, non-governmental organizations (NGO) and private sector interests.  
Therefore, the HSC needs to consider input from all entities when developing homeland 
security policy. Planning considerations for homeland security that are likely to require 
state-level resource commitments; affect immigration, trade, or other economic issues; 
produce outcomes that are harder to visibly demonstrate (i.e., policies that produce 
greater security means that potential attacks are thwarted and become “non-events”); and 
affect a wide range of federal, state, local, and private sector entities are highly likely to 
have local political as well as national security effects and implications. 
The HSC process, particularly the IPC-DC-PC structure, provides structured 
forums to discuss policy problems, agree on the problem set, and offer possible solutions.  
For example, depending on the scope of their responsibilities, some IPCs meet regularly 
(weekly or even several times daily in a crisis situation), while others meet only when 
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developments or planning require policy synchronization. They are responsible for 
managing the development and implementation of national and homeland security 
policies when they involve more than one government agency. The IPC, DC, and PC 
have specific NSS staff to lead each group, and they provide an email containing meeting 
agendas with specific items of discussion or proposed decision-making items as well as a 
“read ahead” package, which contains the policy proposal(s) to be discussed at the 
meeting. Finally, they will provide a summary of conclusions after the meeting to 
describe what occurred and any action items expected of the attendees.  If an action 
includes commenting on a proposed policy, the NSS will provide a comment matrix for 
the IPC/DC members to document their comments and proposed changes. See Figure 1 
for sample IPC agenda and Figure 2 sample comment matrix. 
 
Figure 1.   Sample Agenda from Domestic Resilience Group Interagency Policy 
Committee Meeting (From National Security Staff, 2011)
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National Preparedness Goal (Draft) - Comment Submission Form 
Reviewer's Name:   Please save file as: 
NPG_Comments_LastName_MMDDYY.xlsx Organization:   
E-mail Address:   Please submit electronically to: xxxx@.gov Submittal Date:   
* Category Definitions: 
C 
CRITICAL: significant content issue that should be addressed (i.e., content would cause conflicts, flaws, confusion, and/or 
voids when implemented) 
S SUBSTANTIVE: factually incorrect information 
E EDITORIAL: typographical, grammatical, or formatting errors; vague or unclear meaning 
Page Line/Row # Recommendation/Proposed Language Reason/Supporting Citation 
Category 
(C/S/E)* 
          
          
          
Figure 2.   Sample Comment Matrix (From National Security Staff, 2011) 
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In the Obama administration, IPCs are expected whenever possible to find 
consensus before elevating issues to DCs.  As described earlier, the HSC process includes 
about 26 federal department and agency representatives, unlike the NSC process that 
includes substantially less participants.  
However, the HSC model does not include representation from diverse, non-
federal homeland security stakeholders.  There are no local, state, tribal, or territorial 
government representatives in the HSC process.  In addition, there are no representatives 
from the Homeland Security Advisory Committee as promised by the Bush 
administration. It does not include a forum for input or discussion of solutions with non-
federal stakeholders. 
The HSC process does provide prescriptive requirements regarding group 
membership, decision-making processes, and planning. As defined in HSPD-1, IPC 
members will have representatives from each member agency of the DC and: 
the HSC/DC shall have the following as its regular members: the Deputy 
Secretary of the Treasury; the Deputy Secretary of Defense; the Deputy 
Attorney General; the Deputy Secretary of Health and Human Services; 
the Deputy Secretary of Transportation; the Deputy Director of the Office 
of Homeland Security (who serves as Chairman); the Deputy Director of 
Central Intelligence; the Deputy Director of the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation; the Deputy Director of the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency; the Deputy Director of the Office of Management and Budget; 
and the Assistant to the President and Chief of Staff to the Vice President. 
The Assistant to the President and Deputy National Security Advisor shall 
be invited to attend all meetings of the HSC/DC. The following people 
shall be invited to attend when issues pertaining to their responsibilities 
and expertise are to be discussed: the Deputy Secretary of State; the 
Deputy Secretary of the Interior; the Deputy Secretary of Agriculture; the 
Deputy Secretary of Commerce; the Deputy Secretary of Labor; the 
Deputy Secretary of Energy; the Deputy Secretary of Veterans Affairs; the 
Deputy Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency; the 
Deputy National Security Advisor for Combating Terrorism; and the 
Special Advisor to the President for Cyberspace Security. The Executive 
Secretary of the Office of Homeland Security shall serve as Executive 
Secretary of the HSC/DC. Other senior officials shall be invited, when 
appropriate. (Bush, 2001)   
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The HSPD also defines the decision-making process as:  
Homeland Security Council Policy Coordination Committees HSC Policy 
Coordination Committees (HSC/PCCs) shall coordinate the development 
and implementation of homeland security policies by multiple departments 
and agencies throughout the Federal government, and shall coordinate 
those policies with State and local government. The HSC/PCCs shall be 
the main day-to-day for a for interagency coordination of homeland 
security policy. They shall provide policy analysis for consideration by the 
more senior committees of the HSC system and ensure timely responses to 
decisions made by the President. Each HSC/PCC shall include 
representatives from the executive departments, offices, and agencies 
represented in the HSC/DC (Bush, 2001).   
President Bush further defined process when he issued HSPD-8 Annex I 
(National Planning) on December 4, 2007.  It provided for a standardized approach to 
national planning: 
…to integrate and effect policy and operational objectives to prevent, 
protect against, respond to, and recover from all hazards, and comprised: 
(a) a standardized Federal planning process; (b) national planning 
doctrine; (c) resourced operational and tactical planning capabilities at 
each Federal department and agency with a role in homeland security; (d) 
strategic guidance, strategic plans, concepts of operations, and operations 
plans and as appropriate, tactical plans; and (e) a system for integrating 
plans among all levels of government.” (Bush, 2007)  
The HSC process has mixed results with respect to transparency.  The HSPD 
establishing the HSC and its process was transparent. For example, in a show of 
transparency, the pandemic IPC issued a 3-6-12-24 month progress report on the over 
300 actions prescribed in the Pandemic Implementation Plan (Bush, 2006).  The 
Pandemic IPC also corresponded with 53 state and territorial government officials in an 
effort to improve state pandemic plans.  The IPC requested copies of the state/territorial 
pandemic plans and then reviewed them and provided written feedback to the states.  The 
pandemic IPC met weekly for three years with little change in membership, resulting in a 
level of trust between the members, which was perceived as high.  This level of trust 
helped facilitate effective discussions and quicker turn-around on development and 
review of policy documents.  However, as previously noted, lack of transparency was an 
issue with the process used to revise the National Response Framework.  While FEMA, 
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the sub-IPC and Domestic Resilience Group (DRG) IPC initially solicited input from 
non-federal stakeholders; it then kept it in the federal circle for review for over five 
months before sending it again to non-federal stakeholders.  
While the HSPD establishes equality among federal members with respect to 
consideration of policy input, it does not provide equality for the Homeland Security 
Advisory Council or non-federal stakeholders and it does not provide for the widest, 
diverse input possible.  As pointed out by homeland security professionals, the HSC and 
DHS “failed to meaningfully consult with state and local governments” in the 
development of the NRF and they “were under no obligation to make any changes to the 
draft NRF based on comments from state and local governments” (Baca, 2010).  
Likewise, as GAO has reported in a number of its reports on homeland security (e.g., 
GAO-01-1158T, GAO-02-621T, GAO-08-768) that FEMA, and other federal agencies 
need to integrate state, local, non-governmental, and private sector input into homeland 
security policy, plans, and processes. 
Finally, with respect to timeliness, the HSC process is geared toward the NSS 
staff’s requirements to develop and issue homeland security policies and strategies in an 
expedited manner.  It does not provide stakeholders in the process significant time to 
review policy documents and provide substantial input.  Generally, an assistant secretary 
represents a department on an IPC and must work within their department to ensure the 
officials within the department who have an interest or equity in the proposed policy have 
an opportunity to review and comment on the document.  The department officials who 
have equity can be from headquarters offices or separate bureaus; therefore, it will take 
time to distribute and receive comments back.  Often the IPC leadership will require 
input on a document within a week of a meeting.  Recently, departments were required to 
return input on the National Preparedness Goal in a 24-hour period before it was final and 
signed.  This did not provide adequate time to many large departments to ensure final 
concurrence. 
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IV. QUADRENNIAL HOMELAND SECURITY REVIEW MODEL 
A. OVERVIEW OF THE MODEL 
This chapter outlines the Department of Homeland Security’s model used to 
perform the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (QHSR) to gather and integrate 
stakeholder input into the QHSR report and examines whether it could be used by the 
National Security Staff as a model to incorporate state, local, and tribal input into the 
national homeland security policy and strategy development process.  
1. Background 
The requirement for DHS to coordinate with state, local, tribal governments, 
private sector, and nongovernmental organizations can be found in a variety of 
Presidential directives and public laws. Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5, 
Management of Domestic Incidents, issued February 28, 2003, required the Secretary of 
Homeland Security to “coordinate with state and local governments, and private and 
nongovernmental sectors to ensure adequate planning, equipment, training, and exercise 
activities and to promote partnerships to address incident management capabilities” 
(Bush, 2003).  The Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006 required 
DHS and FEMA to partner with state, local, and tribal governments and emergency 
response providers, private sector and nongovernmental organizations to “build an 
efficient and effective national system of emergency management” (PL 109-295 Sec 
503).  It also required that FEMA develop “robust Regional Offices that would work with 
State, local, and tribal governments, emergency response providers, and other appropriate 
entities to identify and address regional priorities,” and, section 508 of the act called for 
the Secretary of DHS to establish the National Advisory Council to advise the FEMA 
Administrator on all aspects of emergency management.  
The Implementing the Recommendations of the 9-11 Commission Act of 2007 
amended Title VII of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 by adding the following: 
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REQUIREMENT.—(1) QUADRENNIAL REVIEWS REQUIRED.—In 
fiscal year 2009, and every 4 years thereafter, the Secretary shall conduct a 
review of the homeland security of the Nation (in this section referred to 
as a ‘quadrennial homeland security review’). 
(2) SCOPE OF REVIEWS.—Each quadrennial homeland security review 
shall be a comprehensive examination of the homeland security strategy of 
the Nation, including recommendations regarding the long-term strategy 
and priorities of the Nation for homeland security and guidance on the 
programs, assets, capabilities, budget, policies, and authorities of the 
Department. 
(3) CONSULTATION.—The Secretary shall conduct each quadrennial 
homeland security review under this subsection in consultation with— 
(A) the heads of other Federal agencies, including the Attorney General, 
the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Health 
and Human Services, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of 
Agriculture, and the Director of National Intelligence; 
(B) key officials of the Department; and 
(C) other relevant governmental and nongovernmental entities, including 
State, local, and tribal government officials, members of Congress, private 
sector representatives, academics, and other policy experts [emphasis 
added]. (110th Congress, 2007) 
In addition to the above requirements, President Bush’s National Strategy for 
Homeland Security (2007) and President Obama’s National Security Strategy (2010) both 
highlight the need for federal, state, local, and tribal governments and private sector to 
work together in order to protect the homeland.  President Obama did not authorize a 
separate homeland security strategy but rather included homeland security as part of his 
overall National Security Strategy.  In it, he stresses a “whole of government approach.” 
The strategy concludes that homeland security is not simply about government action 
alone, but rather it is about the collective strength of the entire country.  Furthermore, the 
administration’s strategy also states, “the ideas, values, energy, creativity, and resilience 
of our citizens are America’s greatest resource” and therefore, the administration must 
“tap the ingenuity outside government through strategic partnerships with the private 
sector, nongovernmental organizations, foundations, and community-based 
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organizations” (Obama, 2010, p. 23).  DHS’s Quadrennial Homeland Security Review is 
a good example of engagement and transparency (2010).  
2. Overview and Description of the Process 
In February 2010, the Secretary of Homeland Security delivered the first 
Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (QHSR) report to Congress.  In her transmittal 
letter, Secretary Napolitano noted:  
…this homeland security review addresses both the threats presented and 
the framework for our strategic response. The QHSR identifies the 
importance of what we refer to as the homeland security enterprise—that 
is, the federal, state, local, tribal, territorial, nongovernmental, and private-
sector entities, as well as individuals, families, and communities who 
share a common national interest in the safety and security of America and 
the American population. (DHS, 2010)   
The purpose of the QHSR was to “outline the strategic framework to guide the 
activities of participants in homeland security toward a common end” (DHS, 2010). For 
DHS, the QHSR process and the follow-on “Bottom-up Review” (BUR) helped the 
Department to conduct an overall assessment of its operations and then establish a 
roadmap for the future.  The report identified programs and capabilities that DHS needed 
to improve or develop, and, therefore, the report, if used correctly, should inform DHS’s 
budget plans and submissions to Congress.  
In preparing the QHSR, the Department benefited from the interaction with 
thousands of individuals from across the country and outside the country.  According to 
DHS, more than 100 stakeholder associations and 500 experts from government at all 
levels, as well as academia and the private sector were engaged in the QHSR process 
(DHS, 2010).   
DHS initiated the QHSR in August 2007. Led by the DHS Office of Policy, the 
department initially formed an internal DHS working group and conducted outreach with 
the Department of Defense and congressional committees to develop the department’s 
methodology and approach for conducting the review (GAO, 2010).  In July 2009, the 
department issued its QHSR terms of reference, outlining the framework for conducting 
the quadrennial review and identifying threats and assumptions to be used in conducting 
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the review.2 Through the terms of reference, DHS identified the initial four homeland 
security missions to be studied—Counterterrorism and Domestic Security Management; 
Securing Our Borders; Smart and Tough Enforcement of Immigration Laws; and 
Preparing for, Responding to, and Recovering from Disasters—as well as three other 
non-mission study areas to be part of the review—DHS Strategic Management, 
Homeland Security National Risk Assessments, and Homeland Security Planning and 
Capabilities. The fifth QHSR mission on Safeguarding and Securing Cyberspace was 
added after DHS issued the terms of reference (DHS, 2009; GAO, 2010).  
DHS established seven study groups for the QHSR corresponding to the mission 
areas and composed of officials from across DHS offices and components.  The study 
groups were each led by a DHS official and facilitated by an independent subject matter 
expert from the Homeland Security Studies and Analysis Institute, which is a federally 
funded research and development center that advises DHS (GAO, 2010). The purpose of 
the study groups was to define the nature and purpose of the homeland security missions, 
describe the primary national tools required to enable those missions, and identify and 
bring forward any major divergent points of view regarding the mission areas or national 
tools. The study groups contained over 200 participants from 42 DHS directorates, 
components, and offices.  In addition, a steering committee, consisting of DHS senior 
leadership, convened weekly to ensure integration and consistency across the various 
studies. Finally, the DHS Deputy Secretary lead senior leadership meetings at the end of 
the study group deliberation period to review and concur on study group 
recommendations (DHS, 2010).  The study groups conducted their analysis over a five-
month period with work products, such as outlines of missions and assumptions, being 
shared with other stakeholder groups, in order to develop goals and objectives for each 
mission (DHS, 2010; GAO, 2010). Table 1 summarizes the internal stakeholder process. 
                                                 
2 DHS distributed the draft QHSR terms of reference for internal DHS review in May 2009. The final 
draft QHSR terms of reference was distributed to study group lead officials in early June 2009. The 
Secretary of Homeland Security signed the QHSR terms of reference in July 2009 (GAO, 2010).  
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Table 1.   Summary of Internal Coordination Mechanisms for the QHSR Process 
(After DHS, 2010; GAO, 2011; National Academy of Public 
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monthly basis, the 
committee also held 
formal in-progress 




DHS DHS senior 
leadership—Deputy 
Secretary and the heads 




DHS engaged with the White House National Security Staff to ensure extensive 
federal interagency involvement with the QHSR.  Interagency input was gathered through 
National Security Staff sponsored Sub-Interagency Policy Committees (Sub-IPCs) and a 
special Interagency Strategy Coordination Group.  The six special sub-IPCs, which 
aligned with six of the QHSR study groups, provided a forum for study groups to gather 
interagency input as it developed its content.  According to the QHSR report, over the 
course of the review, study groups held over 35 meetings that included approximately 
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294 federal participants from 26 federal departments and agencies, thereby ensuring 
interagency perspectives were solicited and represented in final study group 
recommendations (DHS, 2010).  In addition, the Strategy Coordination Group provided 
the interagency community an opportunity to share their feedback and perspectives on the 
review.  
DHS also performed Congressional outreach and engagement both to gather input 
and perspectives and to ensure compliance with the congressional intent of the 9-11 Act, 
which required the QHSR.  DHS provided its resource plan to Congress in early 2008 and 
testified multiple times over 2008 and 2009.  In addition, DHS briefed numerous 
Congressional Committee staff members throughout 2009. 
In order to ensure the widest possible outreach to key state, local, and tribal 
partners as well as the general public, DHS used several mechanisms over the course of 
the study and report development period.  First, there was a “Stakeholder Call for 
Comment” where the Secretary of Homeland Security began the QHSR study period with 
a letter to 118 homeland security stakeholder organizations representing state, local, 
tribal, territorial, nongovernmental, private-sector, and professional interests having roles 
and responsibilities in homeland security activities, inviting these organizations to submit 
papers and other materials relating to the QHSR study areas. DHS learned that no one 
office within DHS held the list of stakeholders so, prior to the call for comment, a list 
was compiled by reaching out to each component in DHS and gathering the information.  
As a result of the call for comments, over 40 position papers were received and 
disseminated to study groups, and these papers helped to frame and inform the 
deliberations of the study groups. According to DHS, this early engagement of homeland 
security stakeholders at the beginning of the review process was a critical element of the 
QHSR (GAO, 2010). 
Next, the most significant element of the engagement with stakeholders was the 
“National Dialogue on the QHSR” (DHS, 2010). DHS held three online, collaborative 
sessions (National Dialogues) to capture the direct input and perspectives of participants 
in the homeland security enterprise. Each National Dialogue presented study group 
materials that were posted for a period of seven to 10 days for dialogue participants to 
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rate and provide comment (DHS, 2010). The National Dialogues were open to anyone 
who wanted to provide input on QHSR content, although the Department engaged in 
deliberate outreach to several hundred organizations with interests in homeland security 
(DHS, 2010). Over the course of three dialogues, more than 20,000 visits were logged, 
resulting in over 3,000 comments on study group material. Revised study group materials 
were posted on each subsequent dialogue, demonstrating how materials evolved over the 
course of the review and showing participants how their comments informed study group 
work (National Academy of Public Administration, 2010). 
Finally, the last method to collect state/local/tribal input was through what DHS 
called a “virtual” QHSR Executive Committee.  DHS invited the leadership of the 
following 10 key stakeholder associations that it considered broadly representative of 
state, local, tribal, and territorial governments to form the committee:  
• The National Governors Association,  
• the Council of State Governments, the U.S. Conference of Mayors,  
• the National League of Cities, the National Association of Counties,  
• the National Council of State Legislatures,  
• the National Congress of American Indians,  
• the International City/County Management Association,  
• the National Emergency Management Association, and  
• the International Association of Emergency Managers (DHS, 2010).  
In addition, DHS held monthly teleconferences with the participating 
organizations throughout the analytic phase of the review to keep these organizations 
appraised of review progress.  The Secretary of Homeland Security also met in person 
with leadership representatives of the Executive Committee organizations to share key 
findings and recommendations of the QHSR (DHS, 2010).  Table 2 summarizes the 
external coordination mechanisms used for the QHSR process. 
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Table 2.   DHS External Coordination Mechanisms for QHSR Process (After DHS, 
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groups that were used 
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inform study group 
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43 documents. 
National Dialogue on 
QHSR-Web-based 
Discussion Forum 
DHS and the National 
Academy of Public 
Administration 
Open to anyone 
including the general 
public, who wanted to 
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QHSR content. Other 
participants that DHS 
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in homeland security 
such as business and 
Provided a series of 
web-based 
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direct input and 
perspectives from 
participants to 
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3 The Office of Management and Budget Under Executive Order 11030, as amended, substantively 
reviews and clears all draft Presidential Executive Orders, legislation, and other key administration policy 
documents prior to their issuance. Office of Management and Budget (OMB) works with the policy 
sponsor to draft or refine the proposed order or document; submits the draft to an interagency clearance 
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throughout the review 
and one in-person 
meeting in November 
2009 with the DHS 
Secretary. 
Agreement on the QHSR report’s final content was reached between the Secretary 
for Homeland Security and senior White House officials. DHS issued the final QHSR 
report in February 2010. 
B. ASSESSMENT OF QUADRENNIAL HOMELAND SECURITY REVIEW 
MODEL 
This section presents an assessment of the QHSR model.  The first section 
describes assessments of the model done by the National Academy of Public 
Administration, the U.S. General Accountability Office, and the Homeland Security 
Advisory Council. The second section evaluates the model against the criteria established 
in the methodology section of the thesis that is: 
• whether or not it provides structured forums to discuss policy problems 
and agree on possible solutions;  
• includes representation from many different jurisdictions and diverse 
stakeholders, providing for the widest, diverse input possible;  
• provide prescriptive requirements regarding group membership, decision-
making processes, and planning;  
• establishes transparency;  
• establishes equality among local, state, federal government and private 
sector/NGO stakeholders with respect to consideration of policy input; and  
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• provides sufficient time for stakeholders to review while giving White 
House policy makers sufficient flexibility within their tight time frames. 
1. Assessment of QHSR Development Model 
In April 2010, the National Academy of Public Administration issued a report, A 
National Dialogue on the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review: Panel Report, that 
discussed the National Dialogue aspect of DHS’s QHSR process and offered 
recommendations to DHS on how to improve the national dialogue process should it be 
used in the future.  National Academy of Public Administration (NAPA), a 
congressionally chartered organization that provides non-partisan advice and counsel to 
government officials at all levels, played a significant role in conducting the national 
dialogue. NAPA worked with DHS and its contractor to deploy the three dialogue phases 
so the report in part critiques NAPA’s performance.  The 17 recommendations fell into 
three categories—preparation, execution and analysis, and iteration and continuing 
engagement. 
In preparing for future dialogues, NAPA’s recommendations with respect to 
stakeholder engagement centered on: focusing stakeholder engagement process; 
enhancing DHS’s capacity to coordinate stakeholder engagement across the department; 
and, building sufficient time for deliberations into its timetable for public engagement.  In 
order to focus engagement, NAPA recommended that, during the preparation stages, 
DHS should clearly understand what is driving the need for engagement, how stakeholder 
engagement and input can address the need, and how it can be responsive to the feedback 
and incorporate it into the product or process that it is seeking input on (National 
Academy of Public Administration, 2010). The NAPA panel also found that the iterative 
structure for the dialogue enhanced the quality of the feedback and engagement.  By 
having three sessions, the participants were able to comment, DHS incorporated their 
comments, and then the participants could comment again.  
Because there are many components within DHS that engage with stakeholders, 
NAPA recommended that DHS enhance its capacity for coordinating stakeholder 
engagement and consultation efforts across its component agencies (National Academy 
of Public Administration, 2010). NAPA states:  
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Mission execution increasingly depends on continuous stakeholder 
engagement, which is powered by the strategic management and 
coordination of the agencies accountable to the mission. If projects are not 
tightly coordinated—for example, if outreach is not streamlined, key 
groups are left out, or efforts are heavily duplicated—stakeholders may 
not clearly understand how their input is integrated into government 
processes and policy. This threatens to reduce the credibility and long-
term success of such initiatives. To deal with this, comments received by 
an agency should be routed to others if they ‘touch’ the same constituency. 
(National Academy of Public Administration, 2010, p. 19) 
NAPA found positive differences between the Dialogue and traditional 
stakeholder engagement methods such as surveys, request for comments, focus groups or 
other traditional, mostly vertical methods.  First, the Dialogue platform enabled a large 
number of stakeholder groups that could not be convened in person; over three sessions, 
more than 22,000 unique visitors visited the Website.4 Second, by using a Web-based 
tool, the Dialogue provided a means to interact horizontally, that is, with each other 
instead of a traditional one-way feedback to DHS.  In that way, stakeholders could review 
each other’s input and comment on it and, even more importantly, gain an understanding 
of different partners’ perspectives. Third, the Dialogue provided a uniquely transparent 
policy collaboration process.  DHS shared not final, vetted policy products with the 
public. The benefits of the transparency included better buy-in, expectations, and 
commitment. 
With respect to execution, NAPA (2010) recommended improvements in project 
management, stakeholder engagement, and Web-based collaborative tool use and 
development.  It found that DHS needed to better align the outreach, content, and 
platform using good project management practices, including frequent meetings with the 
internal teams that have a role in the project.  NAPA (2010) also recommended, “DHS 
engagements should include significant efforts to involve and gain buy-in from 
‘relationship managers’ who maintain close ties with those stakeholders whom the 
engagement wants to involve.”  DHS needs to include not only the 118 associations that 
it reached out to but also its members and those homeland security professionals that are 
                                                 
4 The measurement of unique visitors is the number of unduplicated visitors to the site over a given 
timeframe (National Academy of Public Administration, 2010). 
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not part of an association.  While DHS used many forms of media to reach out to 
stakeholders such as Twitter, Facebook, and blogs, DHS needs to allow enough time for 
word to spread.  NAPA also recommended that DHS continue to increase its ability to 
engage with stakeholders via social media (National Academy of Public Administration, 
2010). 
In its report Quadrennial Homeland Security Review: Enhanced Stakeholder 
Consultation and Use of Risk Information Could Strengthen Future Reviews, GAO found 
that stakeholders needed more time than allotted to provide input and non-federal and 
private sector organizations were not adequately included in the process (GAO, 2010).  In 
the GAO report, DHS officials, stakeholders GAO contacted, and other reviewers of the 
QHSR noted concerns with time frames provided for stakeholder consultations and 
outreach to nonfederal stakeholders.  For example, 16 of 63 stakeholders who provided 
information to GAO about their experience with the QHSR had concerns with the time 
allotted to provide input in the QHSR (GAO, 2010).  Nine of the 16 stakeholders felt that 
additional time would have afforded DHS a deeper engagement with stakeholders (GAO, 
2010).  Nine others felt that DHS consultations with state, local, and private sector 
entities could have been enhanced if they had included many more of these entities in the 
QHSR process (GAO, 2010). The GAO noted, “by providing more time for obtaining 
feedback and examining mechanisms to obtain nonfederal stakeholders’ input, DHS 
could strengthen its management of stakeholder consultations and be better positioned to 
review and incorporate, as appropriate, stakeholders’ input during future reviews” (GAO, 
2010). 
GAO received comments from QHSR participants that recommended that in 
future reviews, DHS allot more time for reviewing and commenting on draft products 
(2010).  QHSR participants that responded to GAO also suggested starting the process 
earlier including the time to complete outreach and invitations to participate.  A 
constrained time period for stakeholder outreach and input was a challenge in executing a 
time-limited process with a large stakeholder base (GAO, 2010).  DHS had to balance the 
benefit of longer time periods for stakeholder input with the length of time the whole 
QHSR process would take. Nine other stakeholders told GAO that DHS interaction with 
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nonfederal stakeholders could be better especially with the private sector who plays a 
significant role in protecting critical infrastructure and with companies that provide 
emergency response services (GAO, 2010). 
Finally, the Homeland Security Advisory Counsel’s (HSAC) Quadrennial Review 
Advisory Committee (QRAC) issued its final report in May 2010 that summarized its 
observations and recommendations to DHS on the QHSR process.  The QRAC, 
comprised of a diverse and representative membership, met nine times throughout 2009, 
and it received briefings from DHS on the QHSR process and provided its input and 
feedback to DHS (Homeland Security Advisory Council, 2010). 
2. Evaluation Against Criteria  
This section evaluates the current QHSR development process against the criteria 
established in the methodology. It looks at whether the model: 
• provides structured routine forums to discuss policy problems, agree on 
the problem and possible solutions;  
• includes representation from many different jurisdictions and diverse 
stakeholders providing for the widest, diverse input possible;  
• provides prescriptive requirements regarding group membership, decision-
making processes, and planning;  
• establishes transparency;  
• establishes equality among local, state, federal government and private 
sector/NGO stakeholders with respect to consideration of policy input; 
and, 
•  provides for timeliness—the model strikes a balance between enough 
time for stakeholder review and a sufficiently aggressive timeline for 
White House policymakers given their often tight timeframes. 
The QHSR process does provide for structured forums to discuss policy problems, 
agree on the problem set, and offer possible solutions.  The QHSR established internal 
and external working groups to work on the QHSR.  For example, within DHS, there 
were the Study Groups, the Steering Committee, and the Senior Leadership Group that 
met on a regular basis throughout the QHSR process.  Each group had specific goals and 
objectives and regular meetings provided a structured forum to address those.  Externally, 
for federal input, DHS used the sub-IPCs, the Strategy Coordination Group, and the 
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OMB clearance process to provide structured input into the QHSR. As demonstrated in 
the HSC process chapter, each sub-IPC has a focused agenda and comment process for 
documents.  There were 35 sub-IPC meetings held over the course of the review. 
Likewise, the Strategy Coordination Group met monthly to provide a forum for 
participants “to identify issues being raised across multiple, similar strategic reviews and 
to share lessons learned and best practices on their respective reviews and planning 
processes” (DHS, 2010). 
DHS used multiple, structured forums to discuss policy problems, agree on the 
problem sets, and offer solutions with local, state, tribal, and territorial partners and other 
non-government stakeholders.  Its initial “call for comment” early in the process helped 
frame the entire deliberation of the study groups.  Likewise, the Executive Committee, 
which represented 10 key stakeholder associations, met monthly with DHS officials 
(DHS, 2010).  However, the most prominent structured forum was the national dialogue. 
The Dialogue consisted of three separate seven to 10 days sessions in a structured format. 
The Dialogue enabled stakeholders to review materials developed by each study group, 
submit and discuss their own ideas and priorities, and rate or “tag” others’ feedback to 
surface the most relevant ideas and important themes deserving further consideration. 
The QHSR process was designed and executed to include representation from 
many different jurisdictions and diverse stakeholders. The 9/11 Commission Act only 
required DHS to consult with seven federal agencies in conducting the QHSR—the 
Departments of Agriculture, the Treasury, Justice, State, Defense, and Health and Human 
Services and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (6 U.S.C. § 347(c)(1), 
2007).  However, DHS consulted with these agencies and also sought input from a range 
of other stakeholders, including its directorates, offices, and components; other federal 
agencies; and nonfederal governmental and nongovernmental entities and representatives, 
such as state and local governmental associations and individuals working in academia 
(GAO, 2011). By opening up the National Dialogue to general public, DHS invited the 




could weigh-in on the QHSR. Finally, by inviting 10 national associations to be part of 
the Executive Committee, DHS tried to ensure views from homeland security 
professionals were well represented. 
The QHSR process does provide prescriptive requirements regarding group 
membership, decision-making processes, and planning.  In developing the structure to 
perform the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review, developed a terms of reference that 
outlined the framework for conducting the review including key assumptions to be used. 
It also identified the study groups that would be formed to conduct the bulk of the review 
work. 
The QHSR process was transparent within each of the QHSR elements. The 
QHSR terms of reference identified the organization, process, and analysis plan (DHS, 
2009).  It specified the group make-up, designated the officials to lead certain groups, 
described the process to be used, and other process information (DHS, 2009).  A detailed 
description of the process was included in an annex of the QHSR report.  The internal 
DHS groups also shared work products and the leads for each study group were part of 
the steering committee so that each group was familiar with what was happening across 
the study groups.  Externally, transparency was obtained through the National Dialogue 
Website where participants could read draft work products from the study groups and 
view other participants’ comments on those products.  
The QHSR establishes equality among local, state, federal government and 
private sector/NGO stakeholders with respect to consideration of policy input but federal 
departments and agencies had more opportunities at the end of the process to provide 
additional input.  In the QHSR report, DHS acknowledged the importance of the 
homeland security enterprise—that is, “the Federal, State, local, tribal, territorial, 
nongovernmental, and private-sector entities, as well as individuals, families, and 
communities who share a common national interest in the safety and security of America 
and the American population” (DHS, 2010).  DHS also made an unprecedented effort to 
include all stakeholders in its QHSR process and, from the description in the QHSR 
report and in GAO reporting, DHS treated all input equally.  However, because of the 
HSC process and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) clearance process, 
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federal departments, and agencies had additional opportunities to provide input to the 
process.  The QHSR was discussed and reviewed multiple times by the DRG IPC and the 
Deputies Committee followed by additional opportunities in the PC meeting and OMB 
clearance process (personal experience). 
The QHSR did not provide sufficient time to the stakeholders to provide input and 
debate the issues and then further debate after their comments were incorporated.  As 
mentioned previously, DHS work groups spent five months shaping the report.  However, 
in a recent report, GAO found that stakeholders did not think they had enough time to 
provide substantial input. In response to GAO’s request for comments on the QHSR 
process, 16 stakeholders noted concerns regarding the time frames they had for providing 
input into the QHSR (GAO, 2011). Nine DHS stakeholders, for example, responded that 
in their view, the limited time available for development of the QHSR did not allow DHS 
to have as broad and deep an engagement with stakeholders as DHS could have 
experienced if more time had been allotted to stakeholder consultations (GAO, 2011).  
Even the study group facilitators thought the stakeholders would have benefited from 
more time to review work products and have additional discussions. 
In addition, in its report on the National Dialogue, the National Academy of 
Public Administration recognized that the abbreviated turnaround time between phases of 
the National Dialogue—approximately three weeks on average—resulted in very 
constrained time periods for the study groups to fully review stakeholder feedback, 
incorporate it into the internal review process, and use it to develop content for 
subsequent phases (NAPA, 2010). NAPA reported that for DHS to improve online 
stakeholder engagement, it should build sufficient time for internal review and 
deliberations into its timetable for public engagement on the QHSR, and provide the 
public an opportunity to see that it is being heard in each QHSR phase (GAO, 2011; 




Provide more time for consulting with stakeholders during the QHSR 
process to help ensure that stakeholders are provided the time needed to 
review QHSR documents and provide input into the review, and build this 
time into the department’s project planning for the next QHSR.   
DHS concurred with the recommendation and has already starting 
planning for the next QHSR. 
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V. HOMELAND SECURITY INFORMATION NETWORK 
UPGRADE  
A. OVERVIEW OF THE MODEL 
This chapter outlines the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Homeland 
Security Information Network (HSIN) program office’s model used to gather and 
integrate stakeholder user requirements and input into the HSIN system upgrade and 
examines whether it could be used by the National Security Staff as a model to 
incorporate state, local, and tribal input into the national homeland security policy and 
strategy development process.  
1. Background 
One of the challenges in the homeland security enterprise is ensuring that critical 
information collected and analyzed by the DHS and other departments, such as the 
Department of Justice, is shared in a timely and secure manner with a variety of partners 
within federal, state, and local governments, as well as the private sector.  Perceived as so 
important, the U.S. General Accountability Office designated homeland security 
information sharing as a high-risk area in 2005 and in January 2007 (GAO, 2005; 2007). 
Therefore, it is important that federal computer networks and associated systems, 
applications, and data facilitate this vital information sharing, and do it in a manner that 
produces effective information sharing among and between the various levels of 
government (GAO, 2008).  This is particularly important for DHS’s Homeland Security 
Information Network (HSIN), which is the department’s primary information technology 
system for sharing terrorism and related information.  The Homeland Security Act of 
2002 directed DHS to establish communications to share homeland security information 
with federal agencies, state, and local governments as well as other groups.  Therefore, 
DHS developed and implemented HSIN in 2004 as the department’s primary IT system 
for sharing terrorism and related information with those parties (GAO, 2008).  
DHS is statutorily responsible for coordinating government networks and other 
communications systems, like the department’s Homeland Security Information Network, 
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with state and local governments.  The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) 
guidance requires DHS to foster such coordination and collaboration as a means to 
improve government performance, including enhancing information sharing and avoiding 
duplication of effort.  Examples of practices to help implement the OMB guidance 
include establishing joint strategies and developing compatible policies and procedures to 
operate across agency boundaries (GAO, 2007).  In April 2007, GAO performed an 
evaluation of the DHS HSIN to determine whether DHS efforts associated with HSIN 
were being coordinated with key state and local information-sharing initiatives. 
GAO (2011) found that DHS did not fully adhere to those practices or guidance 
when it coordinated its efforts on the HSIN with key state and local information-sharing 
initiatives. For example, when DHS developed the system, it did not work with two key 
state and local initiatives that were part of the Regional Information Sharing System 
program5 to fully develop joint strategies to meet mutual needs (GAO, 2007).  In 
addition, the HSIN development has been described as “a well-documented example of 
the failure to integrate properly” with state and local homeland security officials 
(Stockton, 2009). The HSIN program office did not coordinate with those officials to 
develop effective joint policies and procedures, nor did they integrate HSIN with existing 
information sharing systems and ensure that the network would meet state and local 
requirements (Stockton, 2009). 
GAO again evaluated HSIN in October 2008 as DHS embarked on a system 
replacement project called HSIN Next Gen. DHS had stopped further improvements on 
its HSIN system in September 2007, although it did continue to operate and maintain the 
system while HSIN Next Gen was planned and acquired. DHS decided to replace HSIN, 
in part, because the existing system had security and information sharing limitations that 
did not meet department and other users’ needs.  In short, GAO found that DHS needed  
 
 
                                                 
5 This Regional Information Sharing System program is a nationwide initiative, operated and managed 
by state and local officials since 1974, to share criminal intelligence among stakeholders in law 
enforcement, first responders, and the private sector to coordinate efforts against crime that operates across 
jurisdictional lines. Funding for the program is administered through federal grant money (GAO, 2007). 
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to increase staffing in the program office, implement better management controls, 
including acquisition planning, requirements development and management, and risk 
management (GAO, 2011).  
2. Description of the Homeland Security Information Network 
The Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN) is a Web-based, 
unclassified information sharing platform connecting all homeland security mission 
partners. The HSIN supports federal and non-federal partners to establish awareness and 
collaborate and share information in support of the homeland security mission and 
specific DHS mission of: 
1. Preventing terrorism and enhancing security 
2. Securing and managing U.S. borders 
3. Enforcing and administering U.S. immigration laws 
4. Safeguarding and securing cyberspace 
5. Ensuring resilience to disasters. 
HSIN supports reporting and information gathering on all threats and all hazards 
and improves situational awareness for its users. It also facilitates collaboration and 
connects relevant cross discipline partners through Communities of Interest (COI). 6 
HSIN is made up of a network of COIs consisting of homeland security disciplines 
supporting the mission including: emergency management; law enforcement; 
intelligence, and analysis; defense; public health and natural resources; and emergency 
services.  HSIN is designed so that users can securely share within their communities or 
reach out to other communities.  As of June 2011, HSIN was deployed in all DHS 
components and offices, 50 states, 40 fusion centers, 53 major urban areas, five U.S. 
Territories/District of Columbia, Canada, the U.K., and Australia (DHS HSIN Program 
Office, 2011). 
Other DHS component organizations, such as the Office of Infrastructure 
Protection, the Coast Guard, and Federal Emergency Management Agency, use HSIN as 
                                                 
6 A COI is an area on the HSIN that users of like mission can go to share information and interact. 
There are over 35 COIs on HSIN.  
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a tool to further their respective missions and, therefore, have assisted in the 
development, operations, maintenance, and enhancement of HSIN. For example, 
according to the Office of Infrastructure Protection, it works with the critical 
infrastructure sectors—groups of similar private and government entities that operate and 
maintain systems and assets, so vital to the nation that their incapacity or destruction 
would have a debilitating impact on national security, national economic security, 
national public health or safety, or any combination of those matters7—to gather user 
requirements and develop business processes in order to integrate HSIN into the critical 
sectors’ information-sharing environment (DHS, 2009). 
Since the GAO 2007 report that said HSIN was not well integrated with the 
Regional Information Sharing System (RISS), HSIN has added additional capabilities 
and the ability to interoperate with the RISS.  It has improved integration and 
interoperability functionality to facilitate transparency in access to applications, partner 
systems, and data sources.  For example, it has established a single sign-on capability, 
and it interoperates with applications such as Law Enforcement Online (LEO) and RISS.  
It has the capability to provide situational awareness by providing access to the DHS’s 
National Operations Center Common Operational Picture (COP), as well as allowing 
users to monitor multiple, simultaneous events.  HSIN provides a set of processes and 
technologies that support the collection, management, and publishing of information in 
any form or medium.  Finally, HSIN provides the ability for individuals, groups, or 
organizations to detect the presence of or meet and communicate with others instantly.  
Its collaboration tools include: instant messaging function called Jabber; virtual 
teleconferencing called HSIN Connect; alerts and notifications; really Simple 
Syndication (RSS) reader; and, secure messaging (DHS, 2011). 
                                                 
7 The critical infrastructure sectors include agriculture and food; banking and finance; chemical; 
commercial facilities; commercial nuclear reactors, materials, and waste; communications; critical 
manufacturing; dams; defense industrial base; drinking water and water treatment systems; emergency 
services; energy; government facilities; information technology; national monuments and icons; postal and 
shipping; public health and health care; and transportation systems. 
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3. Description of the Process Used to Gather User Requirements for 
HSIN 
In its planning to gather user requirements for an upgraded HSIN—orignially 
called HSIN Next Gen but now called HSIN Relase 3—the program office developed a 
stakeholder engagement and management plan that guided its process for gathering and 
vetting user requirements.  As stated in the plan, the purpose of the stakeholder 
engagement and management plan was to “identify and document the internal 
interactions between HSIN program leadership and supporting resources, as well as the 
external interactions with its stakeholders, stakeholder governance and advisory groups, 
and stakeholder support groups” (HSIN Program Office, 2011).  The plan described the 
functions and activities of the stakeholders and how the activities would be facilitated and 
supported by the HSIN program.  The plan provided a comprehensive view of all the 
interactions and supported a “one-program” approach to executing and managing HSIN 
stakeholder interactions (DHS, 2011). 
First, the program office identified what it termed “internal” and “external” 
stakeholders.  The external stakeholders provide governance and oversight of the 
program and include the:  
• Program Manager, Information Sharing Environment (PM-ISE);  
• DHS Information Sharing Governance Board (ISGB);  
• Information Sharing Coordinating Council (ISCC);  
• HSIN Advisory Committee (HSIN AC); and  
• HSIN Mission Operators Committee (HSIN MOC).   
The internal stakeholders and groups provide HSIN Program ongoing support in 
the operational validation of user requirements and the operations and maintenance of 
HSIN, post 3.0 implementation.  These groups include: the HSIN User Working Group; 
Shared Mission Communities (SMCs); the HSIN User Development Group; the HSIN 
Pilot Group; and the stakeholders/users.  A description of the stakeholders can be found 
in Figures 4 and 5 found in Appendix A.  For the purposes of describing the model, it is 
not that important to understand the details of the stakeholder business functions as much 
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as it is to understand the diversity of the stakeholder make-up and how they provide input 
to the program office, which will be described in more detail below. 
Second, the program office worked with each stakeholder group using a variety of 
means to discuss and gather requirements as well as prioritize requirements.  The 
program office conducted in-person meetings in Washington, D.C. and conducted 
teleconference meetings. It also conducted videoconference meetings using HSIN 
Connect,8 engaged in frequent email exchange, and, it conducted visits to users across the 
United States.  The following are examples of how the program office worked with the 
HSIN Advisory Committee (HSINAC) and the HSIN Users Working Group. 
The HSINAC is an advisory committee set up in accordance with the provisions 
of the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) 5 U.S.C. App. that provides independent 
advice and recommendations to the leadership of the Department of Homeland Security 
on the HSIN. This includes system requirements, operating policies, community 
organization, knowledge management, interoperability, federation with other systems, 
and any other aspect of HSIN that supports the operations of DHS and its federal, state, 
territorial, local, tribal, international and private sector mission partners. The HSINAC is 
composed of individual members possessing expertise, knowledge, and experience 
regarding the business processes and information sharing needs of one or more of the 
homeland security mission areas.  The HSINAC membership is as follows (Federal 
Register 2011): 
• Three members drawn from currently serving state, tribal, or local law 
enforcement; 
• One member drawn from currently serving federal law enforcement;  
• Two members drawn from currently serving State Homeland Security 
Advisors; 
• Two members drawn from currently serving emergency managers; 
• Two members drawn from currently serving fire services; 
• Two members drawn from currently serving public health or agriculture 
sectors; 
                                                 
8 HSIN Connect is functionality within the system that allows users to conduct a webinar using 
videoconference capabilities. It allows participants to share documents and use a chat functions. 
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• Three members drawn from currently serving senior managers in private 
sector industries deemed critical infrastructure or key resources in the 
National Infrastructure Protection Plan; 
• One member drawn from currently serving in an Office of the Adjutant 
General of the National Guard; 
• One member drawn from currently serving State or local Chief 
Information Security Officer or cyber-related position within State or local 
government; 
• One member drawn from currently serving local, county/parish, or city 
government; 
• One member drawn from currently serving tribal government; 
• One member drawn from currently serving in any discipline with relevant 
expertise in state, local, tribal, or territorial homeland security. 
Of the above-described members, two must serve in, or have direct oversight of, 
different state or major urban area fusion centers (Federal Register, 2011). The subject 
matter expertise of this group is intended to keep HSIN on pace with advances in 
technology necessary to respond to emergent and present threats (DHS, 2011). 
In order to collect and validate user requirements from the HSINAC, the program 
office conducted (and continues to conduct) approximately three meetings each year, 
usually in the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area.  The committee can meet more often 
as the need arises.  Besides using the meetings to gather requirements, the program office 
encouraged the HSINAC to provide input during other forums such as the on-line forums 
conducted and the site visits that the program office conducted.  In October 2010, the 
HSIN Outreach Team conducted road-trips to 12 fusion centers, five state/local law 
enforcement and emergency management organizations, and five DHS components to 
“operationally” validate and prioritize the requirements (DHS, 2011). 
The HSIN Users Working Group (HUWG) was created with the goal of ensuring 
HSIN Release 3 contained capabilities that were operationally valuable for all HSIN 
stakeholders. Another goal of the HUWG was to provide continuous and consistent input 
from the HSIN stakeholder community throughout the development and implementation 
of the HSIN.  A tertiary goal was, and is, to create representative oversight bodies 
(Mission User Working Groups) to sustain stakeholder participation in the direction of 
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HSIN post implementation.  In short, it serves a venue for HUWG members to help shape 
the configuration and implementation of HSIN Release 3.  
To provide for continuous interaction by the HUWG, the project office created a 
HSIN Community of Interest (COI) for the HUWG to support the virtual dissemination 
and collection of information and promote real-time collaboration. According to the 
program office, in August 2011 the total number of HUWG members (stakeholders) was 
216 across DHS, federal partners, state, local, territorial and tribal stakeholders to ensure 
broadest representation of HSIN users including over 30 fusion center representatives, 
over 20 intelligence and analysis representatives, and three HSIN AC members.  These 
members are also part of the mission focused sub-groups, which are segmented in the 
following way: 
Table 3.   Mission Sub-focus Groups (From HSIN Program Office, 2011, p. 14) 
Critical Infrastructure 27 Members 
Defense 15 Members 
Emergency Mgmt 35 Members 
ES/Fire 12 Members 
Health 11 Members 
Intelligence 39 Members 
Law Enforcement  40 Members 
Each sub-group has a team of three mission advocates to facilitate its validation 
and feedback processes to ensure consistency amongst all groups.  Furthermore, 
membership in sub-groups is strictly “voluntary” and this serves the HSIN program by 
highlighting who the hyper-motivated Stakeholders are from within a group of motivated 
stakeholders.  The HUWG COI serves as a communications and control mechanism for 
all HUWG activities, and it centralizes all findings and recommendations of the HUWG, 
making them transparent to all stakeholders. 
In addition to using the HSIN COI to collect requirements from the HUWG, the 
HSIN program office has conducted in-person and teleconference meetings and the 
execution of activities normally associated with joint application design (HSIN Program 
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Office, 2011). Joint application design (JAD) is a process used to collect business 
requirements while developing new information systems for an organization. The JAD 
process also includes approaches for enhancing user participation, expediting 
development, and improving the quality of specifications.  In the case of HSIN, the 
program office used the HUWG to serve as a pre-system implementation venue for 
stakeholder/government collaboration on:  
• requirements elicitation through regular virtual validation sessions;  
• design using agile development support; implementation of the system;  
• testing and evaluation—user acceptance testing support;  
• gap analysis;  
• training; and,  
• participation in HSIN user group conferences (DHS, 2011). 
B. ASSESSMENT OF THE HSIN PROGRAM OFFICE MODEL 
This section presents an assessment of the HSIN model used to collect input from 
state and local government homeland security professionals as well as private sector.  The 
first section evaluates the model against the criteria established in the methodology 
section of the thesis while the second section provides some additional assessment 
commentary. 
1. Evaluation Against Criteria  
The HSIN model does provide structured, routine forums to discuss problems and 
offer possible solutions.  The HSIN stakeholder engagement and management plan 
clearly laid out the forums to be used such as the HSIN Advisory Committee, the HSIN 
Users Working Group, the various DHS information sharing communities, and the HSIN 
user community as a whole.  For each group, specific meeting times were established 
whether they were in-person meetings or virtual meetings.  
The model also included representation from many different jurisdictions and 
groups of stakeholders that provided for the widest, diverse input possible. The HUWG 
membership alone contained 216 professionals from across DHS, federal partners, state, 
local, territorial and tribal stakeholders to ensure broadest representation of HSIN users 
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(DHS, 2011). It included over 30 fusion center representatives, over 20 intelligence and 
analysis representatives, and three HSIN AC members (DHS, 2011).  The HSIN program 
office included the input from the private sector by reaching out through the 22 critical 
infrastructure COIs.  The HSIN Advisory Committee charter requires a diverse 
membership.  The HSIN AC diversity includes representation from different types of 
homeland security professions as well as representation from different size jurisdictions.  
Likewise, the vast federal homeland security community is represented in the other user 
groups established, such as the Program Manager, Information Sharing Environment 
(PM-ISE) and the HSIN Mission Operators Committee (MOC) (DHS, 2011). 
The HSIN model provides prescriptive requirements regarding the different group 
memberships; however, it does not clearly prescribe decision-making and planning 
processes.  The stakeholder engagement and management plan identifies the various 
stakeholder groups and their respective memberships.  The HSIN AC was set up in 
accordance with the provisions of the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) 5 U.S.C. 
App.; therefore, it is required to be very prescriptive in its membership.  Where the model 
falls somewhat short is in describing the decision-making process.  There is no 
documentation that describes how a requirement is accepted or rejected.  Because the 
users are involved in user acceptance testing, it is assumed that the user feedback will be 
incorporated in that process provided the program office uses strict system development 
processes. 
The HSIN model does an extremely good job at establishing transparency.  The 
critical tools for establishing transparency have been the stakeholder engagement and 
management plan and the HSIN COI that was created to support the virtual dissemination 
and collection of information and promote real-time collaboration.  The plan helped 
stakeholders understand how the program office identified stakeholders and how they 
intended on interacting with the stakeholders.  The HSIN COI provided all stakeholders a 
means by which to track progress in the requirements collection and validation.  The 
program office has been very forthcoming with information whenever they are asked to 
provide status updates to the stakeholders. 
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The HSIN model appears to establish equality among all its members with respect 
to requirements inclusion; however, the program office has stated that it has 
accommodated state, local, and private sector requirements more than the federal partners 
requirements.  The program office plans to focus on federal requirements equally in the 
future.  The program office initially focused on gathering requirements from non-federal 
stakeholders as a result of the criticism from GAO and Congressional staff.  
Finally, the model provides sufficient time for stakeholders to provide input and 
would most likely serve the NSS from the perspective of flexibility of its tight timeframes 
to develop policy.  The HSIN model has been developed with flexibility in the time that 
the stakeholders are granted to provide input to requirements and system modifications.  
HSIN release 3 is being developed in an iterative manner so requirements are collected, 
incorporated, tested, and changed if appropriate. 
2. Additional Assessment of HSIN Model 
The HSIN model provides additional benefits.  Once completed, HSIN Release 3 
could serve as a coordination mechanism for multi-department/multi-agency operations.  
This would allow for a consistent and on-going dialogue horizontally and vertically in the 
homeland security enterprise.  For example, the Knowledge Management Architecture of 
HSIN Release 3 will enable the National Operations Center or other COI owners to share 
with the broadest amount of HSIN users when desired, while providing the ability to 
target very specific audiences when required.  Considerations for sharing include: sector 
of government; mission area/discipline; subject matter expertise; and, geography. 
The defined stakeholder groups used to gather HSIN requirements could provide 
input on other homeland security initiatives.  DHS issued a Federal Register notice in 
November 2011 to renew the HSIN AC charter.  The HSIN AC membership acts 
independent of members’ parent organizations as subject matter experts in information 
sharing and collaboration.  Their varied backgrounds in the major mission areas of HSIN 
creates an holistic knowledge base, against which recommendations are made to DHS 
leadership on the future direction of HSIN.  The program office intends to keep the 
HUWG and the sub-HUWG to achieve a high level of stakeholder involvement during 
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user acceptance testing and ensure representation from the various stakeholder 
communities.  Through their input, they will shape the way DHS and other federal 
agencies interact across the enterprise providing more information sharing and 
collaborative design of homeland security initiatives and solutions. 
The HSIN model can be used for strategic operations and planning.  The model 
provides a transparent and inclusive process for strategic-level planning.  The well-
defined mission area COIs can be used for broadest level of sharing and collaboration.  
The sub-HUWG or other COIs can address periodic and ad-hoc planning activities and 
each planning team can have a distinct workspace, yet share with all of the planning 
teams at the defined group level. The coordination will benefit the homeland security 
mission and enable unity of effort. 
Finally, using the HSIN model can help align DHS and other federal agencies’ 
resources to mission, goals, objectives, and priorities.  
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VI. ANALYSIS  
A. ANALYSIS OF MODELS 
Since 1947, the President has relied on the National Security Council to provide 
him advice in order to make sound national security policy.  The structure of the NSC has 
been modified over time but since the George H. W. Bush administration the same policy 
process has been in place whereby interagency policy committees, the Deputies’ 
committee, and the Principals’ committee have developed national security policy for the 
President’s approval.  In 2001, the Homeland Security Council (HSC) was formed and 
structured to use the same policy process however; the HSC was much more inclusive of 
the federal executive branch with the inclusion of about 26 departments and agencies.  
This structure recognized that homeland security involved far more stakeholders than 
national security that traditionally focused on foreign policy matters.   
While more inclusive than the NSC, the current HSC policy process is not 
inclusive enough because it does not adequately represent the entire homeland security 
environment.  Local, state, tribal, and territorial governments and the homeland security 
professionals they employ, along with the private sector and non-governmental 
organizations all make up the homeland security enterprise.  Therefore, they too require 
equal participation in the homeland security policy process developing policies that will 
impact them and they ultimately will have to execute to make this country safer. 
On the positive side, the HSC process provides the structured forums, consistent 
membership and processes, and timeliness factor required to make sound policy.  
Essentially following the NSC process that has been used for over 30 years allowed the 
HSC to quickly develop 25 Homeland Security Presidential Decision Directives and 20 
related strategies and procedural documents in its first seven years of existence.  The 
HSC process has been more transparent than the NSC process largely because the HSC 




demonstrated by the pandemic planning efforts, the HSC is working to make the process 
even more transparent so that the entire homeland security enterprise can be involved in 
planning for serious homeland security threats. 
With respect to the second model, the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review 
(QHSR), DHS used a different, innovative process that engaged thousands of 
stakeholders and solicited their ideas and comments throughout the process.  The 
National Dialogue on the QHSR process had benefits. By engaging stakeholders at all 
levels, DHS was able to incorporate “ground-level” expertise and specialized knowledge 
into the review.  In other words, state and local first responders, emergency managers, 
homeland security advisors were able to influence the homeland security review process 
directly.  By conducting a process accessible to all interested parties, without regard to 
their position or formal credentials, the Dialogue provided the opportunity to strengthen 
trust among stakeholders and create potential buy-in for later implementation of policies 
and priorities they helped to shape (National Academy of Public Administration, 2010). 
The QHSR did experience challenges in preparing for the QHSR, executing it, 
analyzing the results.  For example, identifying and recruiting homeland security partners 
and stakeholders was the most important aspect of the execution of the Dialogue.  
Identifying the universe of stakeholders was difficult for DHS because no one entity 
within DHS is responsible for keeping a list of stakeholders that DHS regularly engages 
with; the list was developed by going to each component within DHS and then to other 
federal agencies.  
In its report National Response Framework: FEMA Needs Policies and 
Procedures to Better Integrate Non-Federal Stakeholders in the Revision, GAO 
discussed importance of partnering with non-federal stakeholders in disaster planning and 
noted that frequent communication is one of a number of practices that enhance and 
sustain collaboration (GAO, 2008).  In its review of the QHSR, the National Academy of 
Public Administration made a number of recommendations to continue engaging 
stakeholders going forward and further building its capacity to do so through a more 
robust technology platform as well as administrative recommendations (2010).  
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The biggest shortfall of the QHSR model was the timeliness factor.  The QHSR 
National Dialogue did not provide the stakeholders sufficient time to review documents 
and then provide substantial input.  Both GAO and NAPA pointed out this issue. DHS 
plans to provide more time for the next QHSR.  In addition, the QHSR was a “cold start.”  
In other words, DHS did not have strong, established relationships with the stakeholders 
or held that type of interactive process before.  In contrast, HSIN had thousands of 
regular users that were used to interacting with DHS; therefore, it made the gathering of 
input quicker and smoother. 
The HSIN model used to gather requirements for the HSIN Release 3 has many of 
the benefits that the QHSR exhibited.  It provided structured and routine forums to 
discuss HSIN requirements.  It established transparency by using the HSIN system to 
convey information, collect data, and report results.  The system was also used to pilot 
segments of the upgraded systems so users could experience the implementation of their 
input and then provide the program office feedback.  The feedback was used to modify 
the system and then the users tested it again. 
The greatest strength of the HSIN model was the representation from many 
different jurisdictions and diverse stakeholders, providing for the widest, diverse input 
possible.  Each group provided a diverse membership.  The on-going HSIN advisory 
committee was chartered specifically to provide members from: state, local, tribal 
government; federal, state, tribal, and local law enforcement; state homeland security 
advisors; and the various homeland security disciplines—emergency managers, fire 
services; and public health sectors.  Similarly, the HSIN users working group and the 
entire HSIN user community provide a diverse group of homeland security professionals 
to draw input from that were distributed across the country and the different homeland 
security disciplines. 
In the future, entities developing national homeland security policy, for example 
the NSS or DHS, will need to develop protocols to reach expansive homeland security 
community by engaging professionals that maintain close ties with the stakeholders that 
should be involved. These stakeholders should be engaged on a regular basis. The HSIN 
model seems to be the most suited for this effort. 
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A summary of how the models met or fell short of the criteria can be found in 
Table 4. 
Table 4.   Comparison of Three Models Evaluated Against Criteria 
Criteria Current Process QHSR HSIN Release 3 
Provides structured 
routine forums to discuss 
policy problems, agree 
on the problem, and offer 
possible solutions 




forums to discuss 
policy problems, 
agree on the problem 
set, and offer possible 
solutions. 
The QHSR process 
did provide for 
structured forums to 
discuss policy 
problems, agree on 
the problem set, and 
offer possible 
solutions 
The HSIN model 
does provide 
structured, routine 
forums to discuss 
problems and offer 





clearly laid out the 
forums to be used 
Includes representation 
from many different 
jurisdictions and diverse 
stakeholders, providing 
for the widest, diverse 
input possible  






The QHSR process 
was designed and 













across the country, all 
levels of government, 





processes, and planning 





























Criteria Current Process QHSR HSIN Release 3 
Establishes transparency The HSC process has 
mixed results with 
respect to 
transparency 
The QHSR process 
was transparent 
within each of the 
QHSR elements.  
However, it is not 
clear that it was 
transparent across 
elements. 
The HSIN model 
does an extremely 




among local, state, 
federal government and 
private sector/NGO 
stakeholders with respect 
to consideration of 
policy input; 
While the HSPD 
establishes equality 
among federal 
members with respect 
to consideration of 
policy input, it does 
not provide equality 




and it does not 
provide for the 











policy input but 
federal departments 
and agencies had 
more opportunities 
at the end of the 
process to provide 
additional input. 
The HSIN model 
appears to establish 
equality among all its 
members with respect 
to requirements 
inclusion however, it 
initially 
accommodated state, 
local, and private 
sector requirements 
more than the federal 
partners 
requirements. 
Timeliness- the model 
provides sufficient time 
for stakeholders to 
review while giving NSS 
sufficient flexibility 
within their tight time 
frames 
The HSC process is 
geared toward the 
NSS staff’s 
requirements to 
develop and issue 
homeland security 
policies and 
strategies in an 
expedited manner. 
The QHSR did not 
provide sufficient 
time to the 
stakeholders to 
provide input and 
debate the issues 
and then further 
debate after their 
comments were 
incorporated. 
The model provides 
sufficient time for 
stakeholders to 
provide input and 
would most likely 
serve the NSS from 
the perspective of 
flexibility of its tight 
timeframes to 
develop policy. 
B. OTHER CONSIDERATIONS 
In addition to the criteria used to evaluate the three models, the NSS will also 
need to consider defining what collaboration will look like, what tools should be used to 
facilitate collaboration, and legal challenges that might prevent collaboration with state, 
local, and tribal governments and private sector.  When considering an appropriate 
model, it is important that all parties understand what collaboration will look like. For 
example, the NSS will need to determine if each participant’s comments be individually 
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adjudicated or if only comments from designated representative professional 
organizations.  The NSS may want to identify collaboration success factors and stick to 
them.  Hand in hand with the concept of collaboration are the tools to facilitate 
collaboration.  The correct tool will need to be selected to ensure the best possible 
collaboration process.  Finally, in a federal system, there are legal challenges that need to 
be address when the federal government solicits input from state, local, and tribal 
governments as well as private sector. 
1. Collaboration 
The homeland security environment is one that requires collaboration to develop 
and implement policy, programs, and procedures to defend the nation.  Shared policy 
responsibility exists horizontally, across agencies at the same level of government, and 
vertically, across all level of governments (e.g., federal, state, local).  Traditionally, 
intergovernmental relations due to federalism have ranged from collaborative to coercive 
to competitive (Clovis, 2006).  In many cooperative activities, the federal government 
takes the lead whereby Congress and federal agencies define the scope and goals of a 
program and provide the funding and states decide whether to participate or not and help 
design implementation strategies.  However, frequently the federal government attempts 
to coerce the states to comply with a national agenda through funding threats and 
conditions attached to grants-in-aid (Mullin& Daley, 2009). In the homeland security 
realm, collaborative vertical relationships provide clear benefits but state and local 
agencies must be involved in the policy development process in a collaborative way 
instead of a coercive manner 
The literature and studies on collaboration have shown that many factors are 
important in creating and maintaining well-functioning working relationships between 
organizations (Mullin & Daley, 2009).  One consistent finding suggests that collaboration 
is more likely to occur when issues are significant or are “wicked problems” (Leach, 
Pelkey, & Sabatier 202; Lubell 2005; McGuire 2006; O’Toole 1997 as cited by Mullin, & 
Daley, 2009).  In other words, higer levels of interagency collaboration are expeted when 
confronting more difficult public problems (Mullin & Daley, 2009). 
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Each model recognizes collaboration.  The current HSC model uses collaboration 
at the federal level but it doesn’t include state, local, or private sector.  The QHSR model 
provided a good start for collaboration across the homeland security enterprise and, if 
DHS works to improve the process, collaboration will improve for the next QHSR.  The 
HSIN model exhibited the greatest amount of collaboration. 
2. Tools for Collaborative Environment 
Technology influences business processes, communication methods between the 
public and its government, and our everyday lives.  Technology also changes at a rapid 
pace with new applications being developed and rolled-out what seems like almost daily.  
With the emergence of Web 2.0 technologies, such as wikis, blogs, social bookmarking, 
and micro-blogging, the potential for and realization of unintended or emergent 
collaboration to occur has grown. According to the Enterprise 2.0 expert Andrew 
McAfee, Associate Professor at the Harvard Business School, these technologies are 
significant “because they can potentially knit together an enterprise and facilitate 
knowledge work in ways that were simply not possible previously” (McAfee as cited in 
O’Connor,Bienenstock,  Briggs, Dodd,  Hunt,  Kiernan, McIntyre, Pherson, &  Rieger,  
2009, p. 12). No one predicted the impact social media platforms, such as Twitter, would 
have on the way emergency managers address a disaster, nor would they have predicted 
how Linked-in social media application changed the way people professionally network.  
In addition, new collaboration capabilities, such as Wikipedia, have made it easier for 
individuals to contribute to group effort without requiring formal management.  The 
QHSR showed some signs of this phenomena during the Dialogue when the stakeholders 
voted on and “tagged” homeland security themes and essentially voted out bad ideas.   
Any policy development model used by the NSS should include a well-structured 
collaboration environment that provides both the technical infrastructure and the 
incentives for participation. Additional research that surveys the types of collaboration 
tools being used across the homeland security disciplines—law enforcement, emergency 
medical services, fire service, emergency management, and homeland security advisors 
would be beneficial for influencing how the homeland security enterprise develops 
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policy, strategic, and tactical plans.  The analysis could evaluate the pros and cons of 
each tool as it relates to collaboration on policy and operations.  The tools should also be 
evaluated for cost and implementation elements.  Finally, it would be beneficial if the 
research could look five to 10 years down the road to determine if there are new tools or 
techniques emerging as the next Twitter or Facebook and those might influence or 
improve the homeland security enterprise.  
3. Challenges and Legal Issues  
In the Implementing the Recommendations of the 9-11 Commission Act of 2007, 
Congress mandated that DHS gather stakeholder input into the Quadrennial Homeland 
Security Review (QHSR).  Along with this requirement, DHS also had to take into 
account other existing laws, policies, and mandates that govern how federal agencies can 
engage with the public.  The primary requirements are found in the Federal Advisory 
Committee Act of 1972 (FACA), the Privacy Act of 1974, the Paperwork Reduction Act 
of 1980 (PRA), and OMB Circular A-130 and other directives.  These requirements, 
while well intentioned at the time of implementation, did not take into account how Web-
based collaborative tools would change, even revolutionize government engagement with 
the public. 
The PRA’s goal is to reduce the total amount of paperwork imposed by the 
federal government, and to prevent the government from using its authority to collect 
information not directly related to some authorized function (NAPA, 2010).  While 
reducing burden on the public, some PRA requirements can be burdensome for federal 
entities and delay timely public engagement. Unlike traditional surveys or other paper-
base collection processes used in the past, which may indeed have been “burdensome” on 
the public, Web-based collaborative platforms fundamentally alter “information 
collection” within the context of the PRA.  The process by which PRA calculates the 
paperwork burden placed on agencies does not clearly apply to technological-based 
collection methods either.  Collaborative platforms are built upon principals by which the 
more feedback received, the more clearly participants’ preferences and priorities can be 
sorted resulting in a clearer picture of what the public finds important. 
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Collaborative tools to tap stakeholders’ expertise and ideas have been used 
successfully by TSA, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency, and U.S. Patent and Trademark Office.  Through 
collaborative engagement, participants will contribute solutions, raise concerns, and 
indicate priorities that would not have surfaced otherwise. This contradicts the PRA’s 
direction to agencies that collecting information must serve a clear and predetermined 
purpose. Often, the most effective instances of online collaboration result from ideas and 
information that are not anticipated (National Academy of Public Administration, 2010). 
DHS faced challenges in obtaining nonfederal input during the QHSR process 
because of logistical challenges and legal challenges associated with the Federal 
Advisory Committee Act (FACA) requirements.  According to DHS officials, convening 
state and local government officials for input on the QHSR was a significant logistical 
challenge; therefore, DHS opted to consult with national associations that could represent 
the perspectives of state, local, and tribal homeland security stakeholders (GAO, 2011).  
In addition, FACA affected how DHS was able to consult with private sector 
stakeholders when developing the QHSR report.  The FACA establishes standards and 
uniform procedures for the establishment, operation, administration, and duration of 
advisory committees.   
Specifically, in a recent GAO report, DHS noted that the department was limited 
in its ability to consult with private sector groups on an ongoing basis without forming 
additional FACA committees specifically for conducting consultations on the QHSR. 
(GAO, 2011) DHS was also limited in its ability to seek feedback from established 
FACA committees that had been convened for other purposes. The meeting schedules of 
those committees did not align well with the QHSR study period, and there were 
significant logistical challenges to scheduling additional meetings of those groups to 
address QHSR. In addition, the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Policy (Strategic Plans) 
stated that under FACA DHS could not invite members of established FACA committees 
convened for other purposes to join meetings of the QRAC for the purpose of providing 
advice and feedback (GAO, 2011). One study group facilitator commented that the 
FACA consideration significantly reduced the role that nonfederal stakeholders played in 
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the QHSR (GAO, 2011). According to this respondent, addressing the FACA 
requirements and including appropriate FACA-compliant groups with a broader range of 
academics and others could have affected the outcome of the study group’s deliberations 
(GAO, 2011). However, according to the Deputy Assistant Secretary, establishing new 
FACA committees in addition to the QRAC, which DHS established as a FACA-
compliant committee specifically for QHSR consultations, was prohibitively time 
consuming within the time frames DHS had for conducting the 2010 QHSR (GAO, 
2011). 
In summary, any model used by the NSS will have to take into consideration the 




Secretary Napolitano has placed an emphasis on “the principle that making ours a 
ready and resilient nation is a shared responsibility, and it is shared by every single 
individual in this country” (2009).  Likewise, President Obama has emphasized the 
homeland security is a shared responsibility.  This commitment to the shared 
responsibility requires the White House National Security Staff to make a commitment to 
meaningfully engage stakeholders in the mission, through increased transparency and 
direct consultation. Continued engagement will not only build trust and support from 
those entities, but it will greatly improve the homeland security enterprise.  As a result, 
this research set out to identify a model that would provide the most effective and 
efficient manner to engage local, state, tribal, and private sector partners during the 
national homeland security policy development process.   
After analyzing the various models, there appears to be no one specific model that 
can be directly adopted by the National Security Staff to ensure collaborative homeland 
security policy development with emphasis on vertical integration in the homeland 
security enterprise.  However, the research has identified key elements from each model 
that should be adopted by the NSS to create a hybrid model that can be successful as the 
NSS develops homeland security policies, strategies, plans, and procedures in the future. 
First and foremost, transparency is critical.  Each model evaluated had an element 
of transparency that helped make it effective and should be considered as part of the 
ultimate solution.  For example, the current process used by the NSS makes use of a 
comment adjudication matrix.  Each federal department that comments on a NSS 
developed policy is able to see via the comment adjudication matrix (See figure 2 in 
Chapter III) how their comments were adjudicated.  Similarly, the QHSR model used 
each successive National Dialogue session to refine the QHSR products further, 
incorporating comments from the enterprise collected in the previous Dialogue session.  
The Dialogue also enabled state, local, and private sector participants to view pre-
decisional government documents as well as the comments made by others within the 
homeland security enterprise.  The model used by the HSIN program office enabled users 
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to clearly see why some user requirements were adopted and others were not.  By 
including users in system acceptance testing, they played a major role in identifying 
positive and negative results leading to system modifications.  In addition, as new 
requirements are identified and the system is upgraded and modified in the future, this 
model will continue to benefit both the enterprise and DHS by providing a configuration 
management tool and a shared mission focus through the prioritization of requirements. 
While sharing pre-decisional policy documents, especially from the White House, 
may be considered a political risk, the homeland security enterprise identified this aspect 
of the QHSR as a positive step forward.  In its report on the QHSR, NAPA emphasized 
that “undertaking collaborative policy consultation should be as transparent as possible” 
(NAPA, 2010).  However, NAPA recognized that there is a limit to transparency noting it 
as the difference between “fishbowl” and “reasoned” transparency (NAPA, 2010).  As 
cited in the article The Transparency President? The Obama Administration and Open 
Government: 
The aim [of “fishbowl transparency”] is to expand the release of 
information that can document how government officials actually behave, 
such as by disclosing meetings held between White House staff and 
outside groups. But there is another type of transparency, reasoned 
transparency that demands that government officials offer explicit 
explanations for their actions. Sound explanations will be based on 
application of normative principles to the facts and evidence accumulated 
by decision makers—and will show why other alternative courses of 
action were rejected. Sound policy explanations are not the same as the 
kind of account that journalists, historians, or social scientists would give 
if they were trying to explain, as an empirical matter, why a policy was in 
fact adopted, an account that would clearly be aided by an expansion of 
fishbowl transparency. Instead, reasoned transparency depends on making 
a substantive evaluation of the soundness of an official's reasoning, not on 
knowing whether that official might have met with one interest group or 
another. (Coglianese, 2009) 
The National Security Staff should adopt a reasoned transparancy approach.  As 
the paper further pointed out, transparancy can positively improve governments decision 
making by helping to inform stakeholders about the problems that government officials 
seek to solve and the options they are considering.  
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Implementing transparency in the homeland security policy making process will 
be challenging.  First, policymakers will have to be careful what proposals are shared 
with the public because there could be a negative impact on our nation’s security.  
Second, it is difficult to measure transparency—there is no “unit of transparency” to 
measure to determine if the NSS are successful.  The outcomes of transparancy—better 
policy and informed decisions—are also difficult to measure. Despite these challenges, 
transparency in the process is a critical factor to successfully integrating state, local, 
tribal, and private sector into homeland security policy development. 
A second critical element of any model the NSS adopts is the inclusion of a 
diverse set of homeland security stakeholders.  The current HSC process is limited 
because it only includes input from the major federal departments and agencies with a 
homeland security responsibility and not other significant stakeholders such as state, 
local, tribal governments and non-governmental organizations.  However, as part of re-
writing HSPD-8 into Presidential Decision Directive 8, the NSS, for the first time, 
reached out to 25 major homeland security professional associations to gather input.  This 
was a good first step but it represented only a small sector of the homeland security 
enterprise.  The QHSR model and, to a larger extent, the HSIN model reached a far larger 
and diverse set of stakeholders.  Given the ongoing relationships and large number of 
participants in the major communities of interest (COI) on HSIN, the NSS should 
consider leveraging that tool and the COIs to gather input on policy. 
Finally, balancing timeliness and quality of input of policy is a challenge for the 
NSS.  The model that is used has to provide the stakeholders sufficient time to review 
and comment on policy.  The HSIN model provides the best chance of meeting the NSS 
needs over time because the HSIN users are consistent and plentiful, and over time, the 
NSS will establish a working relationship with these users through constant interaction.  
Developing a working relationship through a trusted venue (HSIN) will establish trust 
which in turn will facilitate quicker turn around on policy documents in the future.  
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APPENDIX A 
Table 5.   Homeland Security Presidential Directives issued by President George W 
Bush 




HSPD 1 Organization and Operation of the Homeland 
Security Council 
29 Oct 01 
HSPD 2  Combating Terrorism Through Immigration Policies  29 October 01 
HSPD 3  Homeland Security Advisory System  11 March 02 
HSPD 4  National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass 
Destruction (unclassified version)  
11 December 02 
HSPD 5  Management of Domestic Incidents [Initial National 
Response Plan, 30 September 03] 
28 February 03 
HSPD 6  Integration and Use of Screening Information to 
Protect Against Terrorism 
16 September 03 
HSPD 7  Critical Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization, 
and Protection 
17 December 03 
HSPD 8  National Preparedness 17 December 03 
HSPD 9  Defense of United States Agriculture and Food 30 January 04 
HSPD 10  Biodefense for the 21st Century 28 April 04 
HSPD 11  Comprehensive Terrorist-Related Screening 
Procedures 
27 August 04 
HSPD 12  Policy for a Common Identification Standard for 
Federal Employees and Contractors 
27 August 04 
HSPD 13 Maritime Security Policy 21 December 2004 
HSPD 14 Domestic Nuclear Detection 15 April 2005 
HSPD 15 U.S. Strategy and Policy in the War on Terror 
(classified directive) 
6 March 2006 
HSPD 16 National Strategy for Aviation Security 22 June 2006 
HSPD 17 Nuclear Materials Information Program 28 August 2006 
HSPD 18 Medical Countermeasures Against Weapons of 
Mass Destruction 
31 January 2007 
HSPD 19 Combating Terrorist Use of Explosives in the 
United States 
12 February 2007 
HSPD 20 National Continuity Policy 4 April 2007 
HSPD 21 Public Health and Medical Preparedness 18 October 2007 
HSPD 22 Domestic Chemical Defense Classified 
HSPD 23 Cyber Security and Monitoring 8 January 2008 
HSPD 24 Biometrics for Identification and Screening to 
Enhance National Security 
5 June 2008 
HSPD 25 Arctic Region Policy 9 January 2009 
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List of national homeland security strategies developed by the Homeland 
Security Council: 
• National Strategy to Combat WMD (December 2002) 
• National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (February 2003) 
• National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructure and 
Key Assets (February 2003) 
• National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace (February 2003) 
• National Strategy for Maritime Security (September 2005) 
• National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza (November 2005) 
• National Strategy to Combat Terrorist Travel (May 2006) 
• National Strategy for Aviation Security (March 2007) 
• National Strategy for Information Sharing (October 2007) 
• National Strategy to Combat Terrorist Use of Explosives (December 
2007) 
• National Strategy for Countering Biological Threats (November 2009) 
Other related department-level strategies, plans and strategic documents 
developed under the direction of the HSC:  
• National Health Security Strategy (HHS - Dec. 2009) 
• Quadrennial Homeland Security Review Report (DHS - Feb. 2010) 
• Quadrennial Defense Review Report (DoD - Feb. 2010) 
• National Incident Management System (DHS - 2003, 2008) 
• National Border Patrol Strategy (DHS - 2005) 
• National Infrastructure Protection Plan (DHS - 2006) 
• Small Vessel Security Strategy (DHS - April 2008) 
• National Emergency Communications Plan (DHS – July 2008) 
• National Disaster Housing Strategy (DHS - 2008). 
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independent advice and 
recommendations to the 
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Department of Homeland 
Security on the Homeland 
Security Information 
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operational information 
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Subject Matter Experts 
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that bring people together 
from organizations with 
shared missions to address 
mission specific 
information sharing issues. 
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groups vary in size, 
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have wide ranging, long 
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focused on response to an 
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valuable processes and 
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HSIN end users, 
administrators, contributors 
and viewers who utilize 
HSIN to perform daily or 
event driven activities 
Help the program 
management office to 
create an environment 
of sharing in lieu of 
consuming by 
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the end-to-end system 
development and 
implementation process 
HSIN end users 
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